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The Fourth Amendment Implications on 
the Real-Time Tracking of Cell Phones 
Through the Use of “Stingrays” 
W. Scott Kim* 
 
The rights secured to us by the Fourth Amendment were the driving 
force behind the American Revolution. Today, law enforcement seems to 
forget that fact when they use cell-site simulators, commonly referred to 
by the brand name “Stingray,” without first securing a warrant. These 
devices mimic cell phone towers and force cell phones near them to con-
nect to the cell-site simulator instead of a tower, thereby allowing the us-
er of the simulator device to track a cell phone to its precise location. 
Ninety-two percent of Americans own a cell phone and forty-six per-
cent of smartphone users say they could not go a single day without them. 
Cell phones are not just another modern convenience, they are a part of 
modern life and people should not have to sacrifice a near necessity in 
today’s world in order to secure their privacy. This Note analyzes the 
conflict between the Fourth Amendment and the use of cell-site simulator 
technology and argues that the use of a Stingray constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment search and should require a warrant prior to its use. 
 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 997 
I.  THE CURRENT USE OF STINGRAYS ......................999 
A.  A History on the Use of Stingrays ............................. 999 
B.  Federal Policy on the Use of Cell-Site Simulator 
                                                                                                                            
*  Associate Editor, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal, 
Volume XXVII; J.D. Candidate, 2017, Fordham University School of Law; B.S., 2013, 
Seton Hall University. I would like to thank Professor Olivier Sylvain for introducing me 
to this topic and for being an instrumental advisor throughout. I would also like to thank 
the Fordham IPLJ staff and editors, especially Liz Walker, Patrick O’Keefe, and Katie 
Rosenberg. 
996 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:995 
 
Technology ............................................................ 1005 
C.  Stingray Use at the State and Local Level .............. 1006 
D. How Stingrays are Different from Pen Registers and 
Why This Matters ................................................. 1012 
II.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT ......................................................... 1014 
A.  The History Behind the Fourth Amendment ............ 1014 
B.  The Acquisition and Use of Historical Cell Tower 
Records ................................................................. 1017 
C.  Real-Time Tracking Through the Use of Physical 
Tracking Devices .................................................. 1018 
D. The Mosaic Theory ................................................ 1025 
E.  The Advance of Technology and the Court’s 
Response ............................................................... 1027 
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S IMPLICATIONS 
ON THE USE OF A STINGRAY BY LAW 
ENFORCEMENT ...................................................... 1031 
A.  Warrantless Searches and the Courts’ Responses .... 1031 
1.  The Court’s Protection of the Home from 
Sense-Enhancing Technology ...................... 1031 
2.  Tracking People in Public Areas with 
Stingrays is Also a Search ............................. 1035 
B.  A Traditional Katz Analysis ................................. 1037 
1.  People Have an Objective Expectation of 
Privacy in Their Real-Time Cell Phone 
Location Data ............................................... 1038 
2.  People Have a Subjective Expectation of 
Privacy in Their Real-Time Cell Phone 
Location Data ............................................... 1040 
C.  The Use of a Stingray is Different from the 
Acquisition of Historical Cell Tower Records ........... 1041 
D. Approval to Use a Stingray May Constitute a 
General Warrant .................................................. 1042 
IV. STATE LEGISLATORS NEED TO PROVIDE 
STATUTORY GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF 
STINGRAYS AND IF THEY DO NOT, COURTS 
SHOULD RULE ON THEM INSTEAD ..................... 1046 
CONCLUSION .......................................................................... 1049 
2016] REAL-TIME TRACKING OF CELL PHONES 997 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Cell phone users know that when making a call from their cell 
phone, the phone has to connect to a cell tower.1 They are also 
aware that they are conveying their cell tower location to their ser-
vice provider, who may then give it to a law enforcement agency to 
track them.2 What they do not know is that their cell phone may 
not be connecting to a cell tower at all, but instead to a device 
known as a “cell-site simulator,” commonly referred to by the 
brand name “Stingray.”3 These devices send out signals of their 
own and force cell phones in the area to transfer their locations and 
identifying information to it instead of a cell tower, all without ever 
alerting the user of the phone.4 With these devices, the government 
can determine at what time and to whom you are calling each time 
you place a call, the location of every phone in the area, and with 
certain devices, even listen in on your conversations and texts.5 
Law enforcement agencies typically use Stingrays in three 
ways: (1) to find an individual whose cell phone number they have 
in order to determine his location;6 (2) to follow an individual 
whose cell phone number they do not have to various locations in 
order to analyze the numbers at each location and determine the 
targeted individual’s number;7 or (3) to capture the cell phone data 
                                                                                                                            
1 See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 510 (11th Cir. 2015). 
2 See id. 
3 See Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, 
https://www.aclu.org/map/stingray-tracking-devices-whos-got-them 
[https://perma.cc/C85Q-SPPX] (last visited Feb. 24, 2016) [hereinafter Who’s Got 
Them]. 
4 Id. 
5 Hanni Fakhoury & Trevor Timm, Stingrays: The Biggest Technological Threat to Cell 
Phone Privacy You Don’t Know About, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 22, 2012), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/10/stingrays-biggest-unknown-technological-
threat-cell-phone-privacy [https://perma.cc/SYR4-529T]; see also Dina Rasour, Protesters 
Beware: Don’t Get Stung by Stingrays, OCCUPY.COM (Sept. 17, 2014), 
http://www.occupy.com/article/protesters-beware-don%E2%80%99t-get-stung-stingrays 
[https://perma.cc/RC7Q-VB74]. 
6 See Larry Greenemeier, What Is the Big Secret Surrounding Stingray Surveillance?, 
SCI. AM. (June 25, 2015), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-is-the-big-
secret-surrounding-stingray-surveillance/?page=1[https://perma.cc/48CA-NLAA]. 
7 See id. 
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of everyone in attendance at rallies and protests.8 Law enforce-
ment’s use of a Stingray typically begins with them driving around 
from place to place with the device in order to narrow in on the tar-
get cell phone’s location by gathering the phone’s signal strength at 
each point, resulting in a far more precise location than what could 
have been ascertained from cell tower records.9 This process can 
lead law enforcement right to the doorstep of the phone’s location, 
allowing law enforcement to switch to a handheld Stingray if neces-
sary to walk through the building and hone in on the exact room 
where the target phone is located.10 
However, even in those situations where law enforcement is 
only trying to locate one particular person, Stingrays do not only 
collect the data of the target.11 Rather, they collect the data from 
every single phone near it, within a range of several kilometers, by 
making each phone connect to it every seven to fifteen seconds.12 
This means potentially thousands of innocent people’s phones 
could be searched with no one but law enforcement knowing about 
it.13 The safety of a person’s home will not stop a Stingray either, 
as the device is able to track the location of a cell phone through 
walls.14 
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) released a new policy on 
the use of Stingrays for federal officers in September 201515 but at 
least sixty-one law enforcement agencies in twenty-three states, 
plus the District of Columbia, also have Stingrays and most use 
                                                                                                                            
8 See id. 
9 Kim Zetter, The Feds Are Now Using ‘Stingrays’ in Planes to Spy on Our Phone Calls, 
WIRED (Nov. 14, 2014, 2:14 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/11/feds-motherfng-
stingrays-motherfng-planes/ [https://perma.cc/UZE9-PWNA]. 
10 See id. 
11 See Fakhoury & Timm, supra note 5; Timothy Williams, Covert Electronic 
Surveillance Prompts Calls for Transparency, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/us/stingray-covert-electronic-surveillance-
prompts-calls-for-transparency.html [https://perma.cc/J4AS-RYGC]. 
12 See Fakhoury & Timm, supra note 5; Rasour, supra note 5. 
13 See Fakhoury & Timm, supra note 5. 
14 See Stingrays, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION VA. (Oct. 2014), http://acluva.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/140905-Stingray-one-pager.pdf [https://perma.cc/F22N-
Q8KN]. 
15 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE POLICY GUIDANCE: USE OF CELL-
SITE SIMULATOR TECHNOLOGY (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/file/767321/ 
download [https://perma.cc/7N4A-V22M] [hereinafter DOJ Policy]. 
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them without any policy guidelines or statutes in place instructing 
law enforcement on how to use the devices in compliance with the 
Fourth Amendment.16 This is where the problem lies—should law 
enforcement agencies be able to use Stingrays without at least ob-
taining a warrant first? Part I provides a background on the political 
landscape today. Part II discusses the evolution of the Fourth 
Amendment. Part III conducts an analysis on the use of a Stingray 
in the context of the Fourth Amendment. Lastly, Part IV provides 
a recommendation on the use of Stingrays in the future. 
I. THE CURRENT USE OF STINGRAYS 
This Part discusses how Stingrays are being used in present 
day. Section I.A explains the history behind the development and 
use of the Stingray. Section I.B examines the new federal policies in 
place. Section I.C discusses Stingray use at the state level. Lastly, 
Section I.D focuses on the differences between a Stingray and pen 
register, and the issue this presents. 
A. A History on the Use of Stingrays 
Originally created for the military and spy agencies,17 Federal 
and state agencies began using cellular surveillance techniques as 
early as the 1990s. It is impossible to know the exact beginning of 
their use due to the secret nature of the devices, but the first indi-
cation of use by federal, state, and local law enforcement and intel-
ligence agencies was in 1991 when they began using passive surveil-
lance techniques.18 Devices more similar to the Stingray, which 
                                                                                                                            
16 See Who’s Got Them, supra note 3. Approximately eleven states have laws regarding 
law enforcement’s tracking of cell phones. Brandon Ellington Patterson, Police Use This 
Secret Military Snooping Gadget to Track Cell Phones. But Is It Legal?, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 
4, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/03/maryland-stingray-
appeals-court-opinion [https://perma.cc/D2L8-HFND]. At least five states have enacted 
statutes mandating a warrant before their use. See infra notes 84–88. 
17 See John Kelly, Cellphone Data Spying: It’s Not Just the NSA, USA TODAY (Dec. 8, 
2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/08/cellphone-data-
spying-nsa-police/3902809/ [https://perma.cc/6ND4-G9U6]. 
18 See Glen L. Roberts, Who’s on the Line? Cellular Phone Interception at Its Best, FULL 
DISCLOSURE (1991), http://67.225.133.110/~gbpprorg/2600/harris.txt [https://perma 
.cc/TU5X-QZEP] (describing the marketing of TriggerFish devices to law enforcement 
agencies at the National Technical Investigators Association conference in 1991). Passive 
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were capable of active surveillance, were used by the federal gov-
ernment and loaned to local and state law enforcement agencies 
starting as early as 1995.19 
The precursor to the Stingray is generally believed to be an 
IMSI Catcher developed in 1996 by Rohde & Schwarz, a German 
manufacturer of radio equipment.20 It was the first purpose-built 
active device capable of performing surveillance on cellphones by 
forcing phones to transmit their serial number to it.21 As for the de-
velopment behind the Stingray itself, which was developed by Har-
ris Corporation (“Harris”), not much is known publicly. Harris is 
the exclusive manufacturer of the Stingray and discloses no details 
regarding the Stingray on its website.22 The user manual provided 
with a Stingray warns that the device should only be distributed to 
persons eligible under 18 U.S.C. § 2512, which includes law en-
                                                                                                                            
surveillance means the device “intercepts the signals sent between nearby phones and the 
wireless provider’s network. . . . [T]hey can only detect signals of nearby phones when 
those phones are actually transmitting data.” Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, 
Your Secret Stingray’s No Secret Anymore: The Vanishing Government Monopoly over Cell 
Phone Surveillance and Its Impact on National Security and Consumer Privacy, 28 HARV. J. L. 
& TECH. 1, 9–13 (2014) (internal citations omitted). 
19 See FBI FOIA Releases, EPIC v. FBI, No. 12-0667 (D.D.C.)—Fifth Release, 
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR. 260 (Feb. 7, 2013), https://epic.org/foia/fbi/stingray/ 
FBI-FOIA-Release-02072013-OCR.pdf [https://perma.cc/PYF4-8PXN] (“By 
Department Order 1945-95, dated January 18, 1995 (replacing Department Order 890-80, 
dated Apri1 29, 1980), the Attorney General delegated to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation the authority to approve loans of electronic surveillance equipment to state 
and local law enforcement agencies for use in their investigations . . . .”). Active 
surveillance means the device “works by impersonating a wireless base transceiver 
station . . . the carrier-owned equipment installed at a cell tower to which cellular phones 
connect—and tricking the target’s phone into connecting to it” allowing the device to 
“identify nearby phones, locate them with extraordinary precision, intercept outgoing 
calls and text messages, as well as block service, either to all devices in the area or to 
particular devices.” Pell & Soghoian, supra note 18, at 11–12 (internal citations omitted). 
20 See Daehyun Strobel, IMSI Catcher 13 (July 13, 2007) (unpublished seminar paper, 
Ruhr-Universitat Bochum), https://www.emsec.rub.de/media/crypto/attachments/ 
files/2011/04/imsi_catcher.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7JZ-ZPZ4]. “IMSI” is short for 
International Mobile Subscriber Identity. Id. at 4. 
21 See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 18, at 13–14. 
22 See HARRIS CORP., http://harris.com/ [https://perma.cc/5JHC-HZ4E] (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2016). 
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forcement and communications service providers,23 while the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (“FCC”) requires local law en-
forcement to coordinate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(“FBI”) before acquiring a Stingray.24 The FBI then requires the 
local agency to sign a non-disclosure agreement before acquiring a 
Stingray.25 Due to all this secrecy, the earliest public indication of 
the invention of the Stingray is found at the Patent and Trademark 
Office when Harris trademarked the name “Stingray” in 2003.26 
Despite this indication that Stingrays have been around since 
2003, the use of Stingrays by law enforcement agencies did not sur-
face until 2011, when Daniel David Rigmaiden combed through 
15,000 pages of court documents in an attempt to find out how au-
thorities located him.27 Rigmaiden undertook numerous steps to 
avoid detection, including fake IDs, keeping a low public profile, 
and living in the woods.28 Thus, when he was found, he suspected 
the only weak link in his attempt to remain anonymous was a cellu-
lar aircard he used to connect to the Internet.29 This suspicion was 
confirmed when Rigmaiden discovered that the FBI was able to 
locate him precisely inside his apartment because a Stingray 
tracked the aircard connected to the laptop in his apartment.30 
                                                                                                                            
23 See 18 U.S.C. § 2512(b) (2012); HARRIS ASSURED COMMC’NS, HARDWARE MANUAL 
3 (2010), https://cryptome.org/2015/03/fcc-stingray-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/A25X-
JACB]. A violation under § 2512 is punishable by up to five years in prison. See § 2512(a). 
24 Tim Cushing, FCC Denies It Requires Law Enforcement to Sign a Non-Disclosure 
Agreement with the FBI Before Deploying Stingray Devices, TECHDIRT (Oct. 10, 2014, 1:33 
PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20141008/13471728772/fcc-denies-it-requires-
law-enforcement-to-sign-non-disclosure-agreement-with-fbi-before-deploying-stingray-
devices.shtml [https://perma.cc/895L-4VP6]. 
25 See id. 
26 STINGRAY, Registration No. 76,303,503. 
27 See Cale Guthrie Weissman, How an Obsessive Recluse Blew the Lid Off the Secret 
Technology Authorities Use to Spy on People’s Cell Phones, BUS. INSIDER (June 19, 2015, 5:04 
PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-daniel-rigmaiden-discovered-stingray-
spying-technology-2015-6 [https://perma.cc/566D-WA5M]. 
28 Id. 
29 See id. 
30 See Response to Government’s Memorandum Regarding Law Enforcement 
Privilege and Request for an Ex Parte and In Camera Hearing if Necessary at Exhibit 38, 
United States v. Rigmaiden, 844 F. Supp. 2d 982 (D. Ariz. 2012) (No. CR 08-814-PHX-
DGC) [hereinafter Investigative Details Report] (detailing how agents of the FBI and 
U.S. Postal Inspection Service used a Stingray to track and pinpoint the signal of 
Rigmaiden’s aircard after only a few hours). 
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Rigmaiden was ultimately charged with various counts of tax 
fraud arising from an alleged scheme he had concocted where he 
filed tax returns on behalf of various people who had passed away 
in order to recover the proceeds from their refunds.31 However, 
without the use of the Stingray, the government would not have 
been able to narrow the location of Rigmaiden’s aircard down to his 
specific apartment, but instead would have gotten no closer than 
knowing the aircard was in the Santa Clara/San Jose area through 
the use of historical cell tower data obtained from Verizon.32 This 
illustrates the massive difference a Stingray’s tracking ability can 
make in a man hunt because of its ability to generate “real time da-
ta during the tracking process.”33 
Prior to tracking the aircard with the Stingray, the government 
obtained a “tracking warrant,” which is a search warrant issued 
pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
that authorizes the use of a cell-site simulator.34 Rigmaiden filed a 
motion to suppress, raising several Fourth Amendment challenges, 
arguing that “the warrant is not supported by probable cause, that 
it lacks particularity, that the government’s searches and seizures 
exceeded the warrant’s scope, and that agents executed the war-
rant unreasonably because they failed to comply with inventory and 
return requirements.”35 The American Civil Liberties Union 
(“ACLU”), through an amicus brief, raised several issues with the 
warrant as well—”that the search exceeded the scope of the war-
rant because the warrant authorized Verizon, not the government, 
to locate the aircard, and that the warrant was misleading and in-
complete because it failed adequately to describe the technology 
involved in the search.”36 Ultimately, the government stipulated 
arguendo for the purposes of the motion to suppress that the track-
ing of Rigmaiden with the device was a Fourth Amendment search 
                                                                                                                            
31 Rigmaiden, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 987. 
32 See Investigative Details Report, supra note 30. 
33 See United States v. Rigmaiden, No. CR 08-814-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 1932800, at 
*15 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2013). 
34 See id. at *14; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). 
35 See Rigmaiden, 2013 WL 1932800, at *14. 
36 Id. 
2016] REAL-TIME TRACKING OF CELL PHONES 1003 
 
and seizure.37 Despite this concession, the federal government’s 
position remained that the use of a Stingray, including its use here, 
is not a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment.38 
One potential reason for making such a concession was to pre-
vent the disclosure of information that could have been exposed 
about the use of Stingrays through discovery, pre-trial motions, and 
related hearings had the government defended the Fourth 
Amendment issues with use of a Stingray factually. The FBI has 
always asserted that information about the use of cell-site simula-
tors is “law enforcement sensitive” and that if such information 
was made public, it could easily impair the use of this investigative 
method.39 The federal government in United States v. Rigmaiden 
made this exact argument.40 This shows how important it is to the 
federal government to keep the cell-site simulator technology se-
cret. Therefore, by conceding the factual argument on whether a 
Stingray constitutes a Fourth Amendment search and instead mak-
ing an argument at the suppression stage, there were less demand-
                                                                                                                            
37 See Government’s Memorandum re Motion for Discovery at 1, United States v. 
Rigmaiden, 844 F. Supp. 2d 982 (D. Ariz. 2012) (No. CR 08-814-PHX-DGC) 
[hereinafter Motion for Discovery]. 
38 Id. at 1 n.1 (“The United States explained in its March 11, 2011, Memorandum 
Regarding Law Enforcement Privilege that Defendant does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his general location or in the cell site records he transmitted 
wirelessly to Verizon. Therefore, the use of the cell-site simulator is not a search under 
the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, in an attempt to simplify the analysis and to avoid 
unnecessary disclosure of privileged information, the United States will no longer argue 
in this case only that the aircard tracking operation was not a search or seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment, and will instead rely on its authority under the hybrid order and 
tracking warrant, Defendant’s lack of standing, and, if necessary, the agents’ good faith 
reliance on these court orders.” (internal citations omitted)). 
39 Affidavit of Bradley S. Morrison, SAN DIEGO CITY ATT’Y OFF. 2 (Apr. 11, 2014), 
http://www.sandiego.gov/cityattorney/pdf/news/2014/nr141222c.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2K5J-JMLB]. 
40 See Rigmaiden, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 989 (“[T]he government contends that the 
technology used to locate Defendant’s aircard, the manner in which the technology was 
employed, and the identities of the agents who operated the equipment all constitute 
sensitive law enforcement information subject to the qualified privilege recognized in 
Roviaro and Van Horn.”). The court cited two cases that essentially hold that the 
government can shield information about sensitive investigative techniques when a court 
determines that such disclosure would not be relevant or helpful to the defense or “is 
essential to a fair determination of a cause.” Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60–61 
(1957); see also United States v. Van Horn, 789 F.2d 1492, 1507 (11th Cir. 1986). 
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ing disclosure requirements.41 This strategy reduced the likelihood 
that any information would become available to the public, which 
seems to be the federal government’s main concern. 
It is interesting to note nonetheless that the government still 
obtained a warrant in this case prior to using the Stingray.42 The 
prosecutors of the case even recognized that the Supreme Court 
holding that when “the government uses a device that is not in 
general public use, to explore details of the home that would pre-
viously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the sur-
veillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a 
warrant” would likely apply to law enforcement’s use of a Stingray 
in Rigmaiden had they sent a signal though the walls of his apart-
ment to locate the aircard.43 This is in opposition to the govern-
ment’s position taken in their motion for discovery and the DOJ’s 
2005 Guidance on Electronic Surveillance.44 Ultimately, this in-
consistency became essentially a moot point at the federal level as a 
result of the DOJ and Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
each releasing their respective policies on Stingrays.45 However, 
whether the use of a Stingray requires a warrant remains an issue at 
the state and local levels. 
                                                                                                                            
41 See Rigmaiden, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 990; see also United States v. Garey, No. 5:03-CR-
83, 2004 WL 2663023, at *4 n.7 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 15, 2004) (“[T]he reasons for requiring 
disclosure of privileged information at the search warrant stage are less compelling than 
those for disclosure in preparation for trial.” (citing McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311 
(1967)). 
42 See text accompanying supra note 34. 
43 See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 18, at 31 n.160 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 
U.S. 27, 40 (2001)). 
44 See supra note 38; see also ELEC. SURVEILLANCE UNIT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL: PROCEDURES AND CASE LAW FORMS 48 (2005), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal/legacy/2014/10/29/elec-sur-
manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2CC-23WE] (“The amended text of the pen/trap statute 
and the limited legislative history accompanying the 2001 amendments strongly suggest 
that the non-content information that passes between a cellular phone and the provider’s 
tower falls into the definition of ‘dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information’ 
for purposes of the definitions of ‘pen register’ and ‘trap and trace device.’ A pen/trap 
authorization is therefore the safest method of allowing law enforcement to collect such 
transmissions directly using its own devices.”). 
45 See infra Section I.B. 
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B. Federal Policy on the Use of Cell-Site Simulator Technology 
On September 3, 2015, the DOJ released a policy for its use of 
cell-site simulators, requiring federal officers to obtain warrants 
before using them and setting limits on what data can be collected 
and for how long.46 Prior to this policy, the government had long 
asserted that it did not need to obtain a warrant to use Stingrays, 
claiming that the devices operate more like a pen register because 
neither device captures the content of phone calls or messages.47 
The DOJ policy provides, in pertinent parts, that information 
collected by Stingrays is limited to the numbers being dialed and 
the signal direction of the cell phone, as opposed to GPS data.48 
The policy prohibits Stingrays from collecting the content of phone 
conversations, text messages, emails, or application data.49 The 
collected information must be deleted no later than thirty days after 
its collection if law enforcement’s target is not known, or as soon as 
the identity of the target is ascertained.50 There are exceptions for 
“exigent circumstances” and “exceptional circumstances,” with 
exigent being broadly defined and exceptional not defined at all.51 
This new policy does not apply to state and local law enforcement 
agencies or other federal agencies, unless a DOJ component is us-
ing the device “in support of other federal agencies and/or state 
and local law enforcement agencies.”52 Simply put, the policy only 
                                                                                                                            
46 See DOJ POLICY, supra note 15. 
47 See Kim Zetter, Florida Cops’ Secret Weapon: Warrantless Cellphone Tracking, WIRED 
(Mar. 3, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/03/stingray/ [https://perma.cc/ 
5KPF-GL4M]. The Supreme Court held that use of a pen register is not a Fourth 
Amendment search. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
48 See DOJ Policy, supra note 15, at 2. 
49 See id. 
50 See id. at 6. 
51 Compare id. at 3 (“An exigency that excuses the need to obtain a warrant may arise 
when the needs of law enforcement are so compelling that they render a warrantless 
search objectively reasonable. When an officer has the requisite probable cause, a variety 
of types of exigent circumstances may justify dispensing with a warrant. These include 
the need to protect human life or avert serious injury; the prevention of the imminent 
destruction of evidence; the hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; or the prevention of escape by a 
suspect or convicted fugitive from justice.”), with id. at 4 (“There may also be other 
circumstances in which, although exigent circumstances do not exist, the law does not 
require a search warrant and circumstances make obtaining a search warrant 
impracticable.”). 
52 Id. at 6. 
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applies to federal law enforcement and situations such as task 
forces where federal and local agencies share resources.53 
A little over a month after the DOJ released its policy, the DHS 
also released a policy providing similar guidelines on the use of 
Stingrays.54 It applies to the DHS and agencies that fall under its 
umbrella, such as the Secret Service, Customs and Border Protec-
tion, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement.55 Like the DOJ’s 
policy, the DHS policy provides that search warrants must be ob-
tained to use cell-site simulators and provides exceptions for “ex-
igent circumstances” and “exceptional circumstances,” with the 
explanation for each defined in the same manner as in the DOJ pol-
icy.56 The DHS policy also only applies to criminal investigations, 
meaning when the “DHS is patrolling the ‘border,’ conducting 
certain immigration activities, or monitoring conferences—no pro-
tections apply.”57 Lastly, the DHS policy, like the DOJ policy, does 
not apply to state or local officials unless they are working with the 
DHS.58 This leaves it up to each state to individually implement 
policies or guidelines restricting the use of Stingrays by their law 
enforcement agencies. 
C. Stingray Use at the State and Local Level 
Rigmaiden’s discovery that the federal government was using 
technology capable of tracking him through his cell phone led to a 
public desire for information on how Stingrays were being used and 
                                                                                                                            
53 See Tal Kopan, DOJ Cracks Down on Use of Cell-Duping Stingrays, CNN (Sept. 3, 
2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/03/politics/stingrays-cell-site-simulator-justice-
department-rules/ [https://perma.cc/J7WL-BYC6]. 
54 See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., POLICY DIRECTIVE 047-02, DEPARTMENT POLICY 
REGARDING THE USE OF CELL-SITE SIMULATOR TECHNOLOGY (2015), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Department%20Policy%20Regardi
ng%20the%20Use%20of%20Cell-Site%20Simulator%20Technology.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VX9C-N699] [hereinafter DOH Policy]. 
55 See id. at 1. 
56 See id. at 4–5. 
57 Neema Singh Guliani, The Four Biggest Problems with DHS’s New Stingray Policy, 
AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Oct. 22, 2015, 6:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-
future/four-biggest-problems-dhss-new-stingray-policy [https://perma.cc/N787-ULA5]. 
“Border” is defined as one hundred air miles from any external boundary of the United 
States, including coastal boundaries, unless an agency official sets a shorter distance. See 8 
C.F.R. § 287.1(b) (2015). 
58 See DOH Policy, supra note 54, at 8. 
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a battle between state officials and the public over the release of 
this information. Information regarding Stingrays has been hard to 
come by because the FBI, Harris, and state agencies continually 
fight any requests made for information. This starts with the FBI 
and Harris requiring the signing of non-disclosure agreements in 
order for local and state law enforcement agencies to obtain Stin-
grays.59 
Through a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request, a 
non-disclosure agreement between the Erie County Sheriff’s Of-
fice and the FBI seems to indicate that the FCC is the agency re-
quiring such agreements.60 However, documents obtained through 
other FOIA requests reveal a different truth. These documents 
show Harris made a request to the FCC for licensing restrictions61 
based on concerns from the FBI “over the proliferation of surrepti-
tious law enforcement surveillance equipment.”62 The FCC 
granted this request in 2012.63 This means that the FCC does not 
require the signing of a non-disclosure agreement, as claimed by the 
FBI,64 but instead requires local law enforcement only “coordinate 
with the FBI before the purchase and use of Stingray devices.”65 
As a result, it is either the FBI or Harris who is requiring the sign-
                                                                                                                            
59 See Kim Zetter, Police Contract with Spy Tool Maker Prohibits Talking About Device’s 
Use, WIRED (Mar. 4, 2014, 4:34 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/03/harris-stingray-
nda/ [https://perma.cc/Y83T-BB3V]; see also FBI Now Says Stingray Surveillance Can Be 
Disclosed, RT (May 15, 2015, 6:37 PM), https://www.rt.com/usa/259105-fbi-stingray-
nondisclosure-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/JAJ2-EPFT]. 
60 See Letter Agreement Between Fed. Bureau of Investigation and Erie Cty Sheriff’s 
Office 1 (June 29, 2012), http://www.nyclu.org/files/20120629-renondisclsure-
obligations(Harris-ECSO).pdf [https://perma.cc/5XEB-X3GX] [hereinafter Erie County 
Nondisclosure Agreement] (“Consistent with the conditions on the equipment 
authorization granted to Harris Corporation by the [FCC], state and local law 
enforcement agencies must coordinate with the [FBI] to complete this non-disclosure 
agreement prior to the acquisition and use of the equipment/technology authorized by the 
FCC authorization.”). 
61 The restrictions requested were that: “(1) the marketing and sale of these devices 
shall be limited to federal/state/local public safety and law enforcement officials only; 
and, (2) state and local law enforcement agencies must advance coordinate with the FBI 
the acquisition and use of the equipment authorized under this authorization.” Cushing, 
supra note 24. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 See Erie County Nondisclosure Agreement, supra note 60. 
65 Cushing, supra note 24 (emphasis added). 
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ing of a boilerplate non-disclosure agreement, as indicated by ex-
ecuted agreements discovered in the District of Columbia,66 Arizo-
na,67 Florida,68 New York,69 Maryland,70 and elsewhere.71 
Taking the Erie County Sheriff’s Office agreement as an exam-
ple representative of the group, we see that the Sheriff’s Office is 
barred from discussing any information about the surveillance tool 
“to the public, including any non-law enforcement individuals or 
agencies.”72 The Sheriff’s Office may only share information with 
other law enforcement or government agencies with the prior writ-
ten approval of the FBI.73 Additionally, the letter stated that the 
Sheriff’s Office “shall not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, use 
or provide any information concerning the Harris Corporation 
wireless collection equipment/technology.”74 If the Sheriff’s Of-
fice discovers that a prosecutor or court intends to disclose such 
information, the Sheriff’s Office must “immediately notify the FBI 
in order to allow sufficient time for the FBI to intervene to protect 
the equipment/technology and information from disclosure and 
potential compromise.”75 The FBI could then require the Sheriff’s 
Office to “seek dismissal of the case in lieu of providing, or allow-
ing others to provide, any such information.”76 Lastly, the Sheriff’s 
                                                                                                                            
66 See Letter Agreement Between Fed. Bureau of Investigation and Metro DC Police 
Dep’t (Aug. 17, 2012), https://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/283244771?access_key=key-
FKWtXK9zFChGaoOck6zD&allow_share=true&escape=false&view_mode=scroll 
[https://perma.cc/Z34F-4W49]. 
67 See Zetter, supra note 59. 
68 See FDLE-FBI Non-Disclosure Obligations/Guidelines, FLA. DEP’T L. ENFORCEMENT 
(Mar. 8, 2012), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/1814785/hillsborough-
county-sheriff-fl.pdf [https://perma.cc/YV6E-TVBM]. 
69 Erie County Nondisclosure Agreement, supra note 60. 
70 See Letter Agreement Between Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Balt. Police Dep’t, and 
Office of the State’s Att’y for Balt. City (July 13, 2011), https://www.document 
cloud.org/documents/1808819-baltimore-police-stingray-non-disclosure-agreement.html 
[https://perma.cc/AG6U-6J7Y]. 
71 See Sean Robinson, Group Sues Tacoma Police over Stingray Agreement, NEWS TRIB. 
(Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/politics-government/article 
37341000.html [https://perma.cc/RGP4-3VTT] (“[The] boilerplate agreement [has 
been] disclosed by twelve law enforcement agencies in eight states.”). 
72 Erie County Nondisclosure Agreement, supra note 60, at 2. 
73 See id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 3. 
76 Id. 
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Office is also required to notify the FBI if any FOIA requests, or 
the like, are made concerning the technology so that the FBI can 
attempt to prevent disclosure.77 
Despite the plain language of the agreements, the FBI has 
stated that its non-disclosure agreements with local law enforce-
ment agencies are “not intended to shield the technology’s use.”78 
Despite this claim, it is clear multiple efforts have been made to do 
just that. The standard tactic of stonewalling was made when local 
police in Florida neither denied nor confirmed the existence of re-
levant documents in response to a public records request about its 
use of cell phone location tracking instruments, despite the fact the 
city had already publicly acknowledged having a Stingray.79 Addi-
tionally, numerous cases have been dropped when the prosecution 
is questioned on how law enforcement used the Stingray to obtain 
evidence in that case rather than turn over such information.80 
                                                                                                                            
77 See id. at 4. 
78 FBI Now Says Stingray Surveillance Can Be Disclosed, supra note 59 (“The [non-
disclosure agreement] should not be construed to prevent a law enforcement officer from 
disclosing to the court or a prosecutor the fact that this technology was used in a 
particular case.”). 
79 See Nathan Freed Wessler, Local Police in Florida Acting Like They’re the CIA (But 
They’re Not), AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Mar. 25, 2014, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/local-police-florida-acting-theyre-cia-theyre-not 
[https://perma.cc/CT4P-RFSZ]. 
80 See, e.g., Justin Fenton, Baltimore Police Used Secret Technology to Track Cellphones in 
Thousands of Cases, BALT. SUN (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/ 
maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-stingray-case-20150408-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/U389-2S9V] (reporting that prosecutors in Baltimore withdrew 
evidence obtained through the use of a Stingray before a judge could hold a detective in 
contempt of court for not answering questions); Greenemeier, supra note 6 (finding that 
the Baltimore Police Department signed a nondisclosure agreement with the FBI that 
instructed prosecutors to drop cases rather than reveal the department’s use of the 
stingray); Ellen Nakashima, Secrecy Around Police Surveillance Equipment Proves a Case’s 
Undoing, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 
national-security/secrecy-around-police-surveillance-equipment-proves-a-cases-
undoing/2015/02/22/ce72308a-b7ac-11e4-aa05-1ce812b3fdd2_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/3ZRL-RTEC] (reporting that after a state judge ordered the police to 
show the Stingray device to the defense attorneys, the state offered one of the defendants 
six months probation when a usual sentence for the charge receives at least four years in 
jail); St. Louis Prosecutors Drop Charges Before Spy Tool Used in Arrests Is Revealed in Court, 
RT (Apr. 20, 2015, 6:37 PM), https://www.rt.com/usa/251345-missouri-stingray-
charges-dropped/ [https://perma.cc/8X4N-PJFL] (“Prosecutors in St. Louis, Missouri 
have dropped more than a dozen charges against three defendants accused of 
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Perhaps the most startling attempt to withhold information oc-
curred in Florida. After a public records request pertaining to cell 
phone surveillance was made, the local police department respond-
ed they had such records.81 These records showed how a local de-
tective had obtained authorization for Stingray use under the state 
“trap and trace” statute.82 However, before the documents could 
be inspected, the U.S. Marshals Service deputized the local detec-
tive, claimed the records therefore became the property of the fed-
eral government, and instructed the local police not to release the 
records.83 
Such tactics indicate states, either of their own accord or under 
the direction of the FBI and Harris, are still trying to hide their use 
of Stingrays. Washington,84 Utah,85 Virginia,86 California,87 and 
                                                                                                                            
participating in a string of robberies in late 2013 on the eve of a court hearing on the police 
department’s use of a controversial spy tool.”). 
81 See Nathan Freed Wessler, U.S. Marshals Seize Local Cops’ Cell Phone Tracking Files 
in Extraordinary Attempt to Keep Information From Public, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (June 
3, 2014, 12:15 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/us-marshals-seize-local-cops-cell-phone-
tracking-files-extraordinary-attempt-keep-information [https://perma.cc/9E5V-XVAZ]. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. 
84 H.B. 1440, 64th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Wash. 2015) (“The state and its political 
subdivisions shall not, by means of a cell-site simulator device, collect or use a person’s 
electronic data or metadata without (1) that person’s informed consent, (2) a warrant, 
based upon probable cause, that describes with particularity the person, place, or thing to 
be searched or seized, or (3) acting in accordance with a legally recognized exception to 
the warrant requirements.”). 
85 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23c-102(1)(a) (West 2014) (“[A] government entity may not 
obtain the location information, stored data, or transmitted data of an electronic device 
without a search warrant issued by a court upon probable cause.”). 
86 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-70.3(K) (2015) (“An investigative or law-enforcement officer 
shall not use any device to obtain electronic communications or collect real-time location 
data from an electronic device without first obtaining a search warrant authorizing the use 
of the device if, in order to obtain the contents of such electronic communications or such 
real-time location data from the provider of electronic communication service or remote 
computing service, such officer would be required to obtain a search warrant pursuant to 
this section.”). 
87 The California law, approved in October 2015, “require[s] police agencies to get city 
council approval before employing” the use of a cell-site simulator. See Williams, supra 
note 11; see also S.B. 741, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015), https://leginfo 
.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB741 
[https://perma.cc/XT5J-B92D]. 
2016] REAL-TIME TRACKING OF CELL PHONES 1011 
 
Minnesota88 all have statutes with guidelines on Stingray use and 
require warrants prior to their use. However, these states are the 
minority. At least sixty-one agencies in twenty-three states and the 
District of Columbia use Stingrays, and most of these states have 
no such guidelines.89 State law enforcement typically obtains Stin-
grays with federal money on the basis of anti-terror grants, but then 
actually use the Stingrays for purposes other than combating ter-
rorism.90 
For example, the Michigan Police Department paid more than 
$200,000 for cellular tracking equipment, including a Stingray, 
with a DHS grant.91 The department justified the purchase on the 
basis of “allow[ing] the state to track the physical location of a sus-
pected terrorist who is using wireless communications as part of 
their operation.”92 This justification proved to be completely false, 
as evidence shows that the department never used it to track a ter-
rorist.93 Instead, out of 128 investigations where the department 
used Stingrays in 2014, most were for homicides, burglaries and 
robberies, assaults, and missing persons, as well as for minor of-
fenses such as drug crimes, obstructing police, and fraud.94 The 
Baltimore Police Department is another example of a local agency 
without any guidelines that used a Stingray to track a range of crim-
inals from killers to petty thieves.95 
Without legislative guidelines, Maryland, Michigan, and other 
states typically employ the use of Stingrays without any judicial 
                                                                                                                            
88 MINN. STAT. § 626A.42(2) (2014) (“[A] government entity may not obtain the 
location information of an electronic device without a tracking warrant. A warrant 
granting access to location information must be issued only if the government entity 
shows that there is probable cause the person who possesses an electronic device is 
committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime.”). 
89 See Who’s Got Them, supra note 3; supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
90 See Kelly, supra note 17. 
91 See Nathan Freed Wessler, Police Citing “Terrorism” to Buy Stingrays Used Only for 
Ordinary Crimes, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Oct. 23, 2015, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/police-citing-terrorism-buy-stingrays-used-only-
ordinary-crimes [https://perma.cc/665Z-TJSY]. 
92 See id. 
93 See id. 
94 Id. 
95 See Surveillance Log, BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT’S ADVANCED TECHNICAL 
TEAM, https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2287407/cell-site-data-request-
060815-bds-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZW2Q-GUU2] (last visited Feb. 24, 2016). 
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application.96 Some local agencies even use the devices through 
deceptive means.97 For example, some will draft surveillance re-
quests to use Stingrays and make them appear as pen register ap-
plications instead.98 A template for a pen register request used by 
the San Bernardino Sheriff’s Department to deploy a Stingray was 
obtained through a FOIA request.99 Nowhere in the application do 
the words Stingray, IMSI catcher, or anything of the like appear.100 
One ACLU attorney believes this application template is very un-
usual and “likely to mislead judges who receive applications based 
on it because it gives no indication that the Sheriff’s Department 
intends to use a Stingray.”101 Notably, pen registers are far differ-
ent than Stingrays. 
D. How Stingrays are Different from Pen Registers and Why This 
Matters 
A pen register records the numbers dialed in incoming and out-
going calls to and from a targeted number,102 while a Stingray col-
                                                                                                                            
96 See Zetter, supra note 47. 
97 See Clarence Walker, New Hi-Tech Police Surveillance: The “Stingray” Cell Phone 
Spying Device, GLOBAL RES. (May 19, 2015), http://www.globalresearch.ca/new-hi-tech-
police-surveillance-the-stingray-cell-phone-spying-device/5331165 
[https://perma.cc/NLG8-WY9P]. 
98 See id. 
99 See Tim Cushing, ‘Insert Probable Cause’: Pen Register Boilerplate Hides Sheriff’s 
Department’s Hundreds Of Stingray Deployments, TECHDIRT (June 3, 2015, 4:15 AM), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150525/17150031098/insert-probable-cause-pen-
register-boilerplate-hides-sheriffs-departments-hundreds-stingray-deployments.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/4TRP-2E5B]. The agency has used a Stingray at least 303 times. Id. 
100 See id. 
101 Cyrus Farivar, County Sheriff Has Used Stingray over 300 Times with No Warrant, 
ARS TECHNICA (May 24, 2015, 1:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/ 
05/county-sheriff-has-used-stingray-over-300-times-with-no-warrant/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZQK8-G36A]. 
102 See Matt Blaze, How Law Enforcement Tracks Cellular Phones, EXHAUSTIVE SEARCH 
BLOG (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.crypto.com/blog/celltapping/ [https://perma.cc/ 
8MH3-56DJ]. The statutory definition of a pen register is: 
[T]he term “pen register” means a device or process which records 
or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information 
transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or 
electronic communication is transmitted, provided, however, that 
such information shall not include the contents of any 
communication, but such term does not include any device or process 
used by a provider or customer of a wire or electronic communication 
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lects information from every cell phone in its vicinity, leaving the 
disposal of the information collected from the non-targeted phones 
to the discretion of the user.103 In other words, a pen register simp-
ly allows for the electronic delivery of call information from a tele-
phone company to law enforcement for only the numbers specified 
in law enforcement’s requests,104 while a Stingray can track the 
precise location of every cell phone near it and provide the identify-
ing information of each of those phones.105 This means that Stin-
grays “subject [a] potentially unlimited number[] of innocent 
people to dragnet surveillance” with absolutely no indication that 
such a search occurred or that the search may have intruded into 
their private residence or other “constitutionally protected spac-
es.”106 
The Supreme Court has held use of a pen register is not a 
“search” under the Fourth Amendment.107 Furthermore, individ-
uals have no expectation of privacy in the telephone number they 
dial.108 Accordingly, “[t]he judicial role in approving [the] use of 
trap and trace devices is ministerial in nature.”109 A federal court 
merely needs to find that “the attorney for the government has cer-
tified to the court that the information likely to be obtained by such 
installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investiga-
tion.”110 As explained previously though, Stingrays are being used 
to do much more than merely record the numbers dialed and re-
ceived on cell phones; they are used to track people.111 This leads 
                                                                                                                            
service for billing, or recording as an incident to billing, for 
communications services provided by such provider or any device or 
process used by a provider or customer of a wire communication 
service for cost accounting or other like purposes in the ordinary 
course of its business. 
18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2012). 
103 Cushing, supra note 99. 
104 See Blaze, supra note 102. 
105 See Stingrays, supra note 14. 
106 Justin Fenton, ACLU Joins Md. Federal Case over Cellphone Tracking, BALT. SUN 
(Nov. 26, 2014, 6:55 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-
city/bs-md-ci-aclu-stingray-brief-20141125-story.html [https://perma.cc/LX6E-XV6L]. 
107 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979). 
108 Id. at 743. 
109 United States v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1995). 
110 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1) (2012). 
111 See text accompanying supra notes 3–8. 
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to the question of whether or not use of a Stingray constitutes a 
search under the Fourth Amendment and should therefore be sub-
ject to the more stringent requirements of a warrant prior to its use. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
This Part discusses the origin and development of the Fourth 
Amendment. Section II.A provides a brief history of the Fourth 
Amendment. Section II.B discusses the Fourth Amendment’s im-
plications on the use of historical location data before being com-
pared to real-time tracking in Section II.C. Then Section II.D. dis-
cusses the mosaic theory and its potential impact on the Fourth 
Amendment. Lastly, Section II.E looks into the advance of tech-
nology and the Supreme Court’s response. 
A. The History Behind the Fourth Amendment 
The Framer’s disdain for the “general warrants” and “writs of 
assistance” from the colonial era, which allowed British officers to 
go through all the contents of a person’s home looking for evi-
dence, resulted in the drafting of the Fourth Amendment.112 Their 
contempt for these searches was a “driving force[] behind the Rev-
olution itself.”113 The Framers consequently did not want to confer 
any discretionary authority to officers that would allow them to 
conduct such general searches.114 This is why the Fourth Amend-
ment was specifically aimed at barring Congress from having the 
ability to allow the issuance of general warrants; it was not, howev-
                                                                                                                            
112 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014); see Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 
U.S. 307, 311 (1978) (“The general warrant was a recurring point of contention in the 
Colonies immediately preceding the Revolution.”); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 
1, 7–8 (1977), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (“It cannot be 
doubted that the Fourth Amendment’s commands grew in large measure out of the 
colonists’ experience with the writs of assistance and their memories of the general 
warrants formerly in use in England.”); see also Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494 (noting how a 
young John Adams listened to James Otis’s speech against general warrants and later said 
that it was “the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great 
Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born.”). 
113 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494. 
114 See Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 197, 201, 212 (1993); see also Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth 
Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 578 (1999). 
2016] REAL-TIME TRACKING OF CELL PHONES 1015 
 
er, aimed at creating the broad reasonableness standard that is in 
place today.115 
The Framers assumed that the common-law background pro-
tecting warrantless intrusions and explaining when warrants were 
required would remain in place, thereby making it unnecessary to 
implement text into the Fourth Amendment regarding such proce-
dures.116 This is why the Framers were content in stating only the 
standards necessary for a valid warrant as common law already 
placed restraints on the discretionary authority of officers conduct-
ing searches and seizures.117 However, this foundation became 
blurred when legislative codes began undermining the notion of a 
“permanent common law.”118 This shift in policy, coupled with 
concerns about crime and social disorder during the nineteenth 
century, expanded the authority of the warrantless officer.119 
The foundation of the modern Fourth Amendment is rooted in 
Weeks v. United States.120 Weeks extended the Fourth Amendment 
to the actions of a warrantless officer acting “under color of his of-
fice.”121 This had the effect of constitutionalizing the requirement 
of a warrant to search a house,122 and introduced the exclusionary 
rule to illegally obtained evidence.123 The next step was the inser-
                                                                                                                            
115 Davies, supra note 114, at 557–60, 724. 
116 See id. at 724. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 725. 
119 See id. (“New concerns about crime and social disorder during the nineteenth 
century gave rise to a perception that the common-law structure of law enforcement was 
inadequate to meet the needs of an increasingly complex and urban society. 
Contemporaneously with the advent of police departments and career officers, courts and 
legislatures drastically expanded the ex officio authority of the warrantless officer.”). 
120 See id. at 729. 
121 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393–94, (1914) (“[T]he [Fourth] 
Amendment was intended to secure the citizen in person and property against unlawful 
invasion of the sanctity of his home by officers of the law, acting under legislative or 
judicial sanction. This protection is equally extended to the action of the government and 
officers of the law acting under it. To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by 
judicial decision a manifest neglect, if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions of the 
Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against such unauthorized 
action.” (internal citations omitted)). 
122 See id. at 398 (finding that the taking of letters from the defendant’s house is “in 
direct violation of the constitutional rights of the defendant”). 
123 By characterizing the act of the officer as “in direct violation of the constitutional 
rights of the defendant,” the Court placed a warrantless search in the same category as 
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tion of a “reasonableness” standard into a warrantless search.124 
Carroll v. United States accomplished this when the Court upheld 
the warrantless search of an automobile on the basis that the 
Fourth Amendment only prohibits searches that are “unreasona-
ble,” and it was “‘not unreasonable’ for the police to conduct a 
warrantless search of a car for contraband in the circumstances.”125 
This concept of “reasonableness” would become the central prin-
ciple of the Fourth Amendment in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.126 
The reasonableness standard used today was articulated in 
Katz v. United States.127 In this case, the defendant violated a feder-
al statute by using a telephone to transmit wagering information, 
and at trial, the prosecution used evidence obtained through an 
electronic listening and recording device attached to the outside of 
a public telephone booth that the defendant had used.128 The Court 
recognized that “the Fourth Amendment protects people—and 
not simply ‘areas’—against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures.”129 This interpretation makes it clear that whether or not a 
“search” has occurred under the Fourth Amendment “cannot 
turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any 
given enclosure.”130 Therefore, the previous requirement of a 
physical trespass for a “search” to occur was bad law in modern 
times as “reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by 
electronic as well as physical invasion.”131 
                                                                                                                            
the “void” court order in Boyd v. United States. See id.; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616 (1886). The Court in Boyd, in excluding an invoice produced under unconstitutional 
statutory authority, relied upon a conclusion in Marbury v. Madison that the Court has no 
authority to recognize a “void” government act. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 638; Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803). Under this string of logic, exclusion is a necessary 
consequence of a government search that violates constitutional authority. See Davies, 
supra note 114, at 730. 
124 See Davies, supra note 114, at 731. 
125 Id.; see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925) (“The Fourth 
Amendment does not denounce all searches or seizures, but only such as are 
unreasonable.”). 
126 See Davies, supra note 114, at 732. 
127 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
128 See id. at 348. 
129 Id. at 353. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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As a result, Justice Harlan came up with a two-prong test to de-
termine whether or not a Fourth Amendment search or seizure oc-
curred. First, a court determines whether a person has “exhibited 
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reason-
able.’”132 Using this test, it was determined that someone who goes 
into a telephone booth, shuts the door, and pays to make a phone 
call “is surely entitled to assume that his conversation is not being 
intercepted.”133 The booth “is a temporarily private place whose 
momentary occupants’ expectations of freedom from intrusion are 
recognized as reasonable.”134 Justice Harlan’s concurrence from 
Katz has become known as the “Katz test” and is the touchstone 
analysis of any Fourth Amendment question.135 This analysis was 
recently applied to the use of cell phones in United States v. Da-
vis.136 
B. The Acquisition and Use of Historical Cell Tower Records 
The Eleventh Circuit decision in Davis involved a review of 
whether or not a statutorily-prescribed judicial order to a third par-
ty cellular telephone service provider to turn over “historical cell 
tower location information” to the federal government on one of 
its users constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.137 
This data was beneficial because MetroPCS, Davis’ cell phone 
provider, used it to identify the locations of their cell towers, allow-
ing the police to compare the locations of the robberies to those of 
                                                                                                                            
132 Id. at 361. Even though this is a concurring opinion, the Supreme Court has 
subsequently applied Justice Harlan’s principle to hold that a Fourth Amendment search 
occurs when “‘the individual manifest[s] a subjective expectation of privacy in the object 
of the challenged search’ and ‘society is willing to recognize that expectation as 
reasonable.’” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001). 
133 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
134 Id. 
135 See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating the 
Katz test has come to mean the test enunciated by Justice Harlan’s concurrence); Smith 
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (expressly adopting Justice Harlan’s “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” formula as the rule of Katz). 
136 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015). 
137 Id. at 503. “Historical cell tower location information” is historical telephone 
records for a number requested, which shows, among other things, “the number assigned 
to the cell tower that wirelessly connected the calls from and to Davis” and “the sector 
number associated with that tower.” Id. at 502–03. 
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the cell towers connecting Davis’ calls around the time of the rob-
beries.138 This showed the cell tower sites were near the robbery 
locations.139 Therefore, the prosecution was able to argue that Da-
vis must have also been near the robberies.140 
The main doctrine relied upon in Davis for admitting the his-
torical location data was the third party doctrine.141 This doctrine 
holds that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in in-
formation he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”142 Using this 
line of reasoning, the Davis court held that since cell phone users 
know their phone must connect to a cell tower, that the signal is 
only transmitted when they make or receive a call, and that this 
signal is also sent to their service provider, the cell user is aware 
that he is “conveying cell tower location information to the service 
provider and voluntarily does so.”143 Consequently, there is no ex-
pectation of privacy in telephone records that show past cell tower 
locations.144 This line of reasoning is different when courts look at 
real-time location tracking. 
C. Real-Time Tracking Through the Use of Physical Tracking Devices 
The Supreme Court first confronted the use of a tracking de-
vice in United States v. Knotts, where law enforcement agents 
placed a beeper,145 without a warrant, in a drum of chloroform pur-
chased by one of the defendants.146 The agents subsequently moni-
tored the progress of a car carrying the chloroform and traced the 
drum from its place of purchase in Minnesota to the defendant’s 
cabin in Wisconsin.147 It is important to note that the “surveillance 
amounted principally to the following of a car on public streets and 
                                                                                                                            
138 See id. at 501. 
139 See id. 
140 Id. at 502. 
141 See generally id. 
142 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979). 
143 Davis, 785 F.3d at 510. 
144 See id. 
145 A beeper is “[a] radio transmitter, usually battery operated, which emits periodic 
signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver.” United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 
277 (1983). 
146 See id. The beeper was placed in the drum with the consent of Hawkins Chemical 
Company who subsequently sold it to the defendants. See id. at 278. 
147 See id. at 277. 
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highways” because a person travelling in an automobile on public 
roads has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements 
from one place to another.148 While travelling on public streets, a 
person “voluntarily convey[s] to anyone who want[s] to 
look . . . that he is travelling over particular roads in a particular di-
rection,” the locations of any stops he makes, and “his final desti-
nation when he exit[s] from public roads onto private property.”149 
While the owner of the cabin had an expectation of privacy within 
the cabin, that notion did not carry over into law enforcement’s 
observation of the car arriving to the cabin, nor did it extend to the 
transportation of the drum in the “open fields” outside the ca-
bin.150 Law enforcement’s use of the beeper to supplement their 
visual surveillance makes no difference as “[n]othing in the Fourth 
Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory 
faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as 
science and technology afforded them in this case.”151 Further-
more, even though the police would not have been able to locate 
the final resting place of the chloroform without the beeper in this 
case,152 had an agent wanted to, he could have followed the defen-
dant in a car without the use of a beeper and determined the final 
resting place of the chloroform.153 Therefore, the Court reasoned, 
the scientific enhancement used here raised “no constitutional is-
sues which visual surveillance would not also raise,” so no Fourth 
Amendment violation occurred.154 
United States v. Karo addresses two issues left unresolved by 
Knotts: (1) whether tracking a container through the placement of a 
beeper in a container with the consent of the original owner, but 
not with the buyer’s consent, is a search under the Fourth 
Amendment; and (2) whether acquiring information that could not 
have been obtained through normal, visual surveillance makes the 
                                                                                                                            
148 Id. at 281. 
149 Id. at 281–82. 
150 Id. at 282. 
151 Id. But see infra Section II.E (noting how sense-enhancing technology can be 
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment). 
152 See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278. When the defendant “began making evasive 
maneuvers . . . the pursuing agents ended their visual surveillance.” Id. 
153 See id. at 282. 
154 See id. at 285. 
1020 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:995 
 
monitoring of the beeper a Fourth Amendment violation.155 The 
facts in Karo are very similar to those in Knotts.156 
In answering the first question, the Court held that “[t]he mere 
transfer to [the defendant] of a can containing an unmonitored 
beeper infringed no privacy interest” because “it conveyed no in-
formation at all. . . . [I]t created a potential for an invasion of priva-
cy,” but a potential, as opposed to an actual, invasion of privacy 
does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.157 It is 
only when these “technological advances” are actually exploited 
that Fourth Amendment privacy interests come into play.158 
This brings us to the second question. Employing the same 
analysis used in Knotts,159 the Court first recognized the basic 
Fourth Amendment principle that “private residences are places in 
which the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental 
intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plain-
ly one that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable.”160 
Therefore, had the agents gone into one of the residences to check 
if the ether was there without a warrant because they had no beeper 
to monitor, it surely would have been an illegal search under the 
Fourth Amendment.161 Consequently, when law enforcement em-
ploys an electronic device to obtain information from inside a 
house that it could not have obtained by observation from outside 
the area surrounding the house, it too must be an illegal search.162 
This occurred in Karo because even though visual surveillance 
                                                                                                                            
155 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 707 (1984). 
156 After a Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) agent learned that the 
defendants had ordered fifty gallons of ether to extract cocaine from clothing they had 
imported, the government obtained a court order to install and monitor a beeper in one of 
the cans of ether, with the informant’s consent. Id. at 708. Thereafter, agents saw one of 
the defendants pick up the ether from the informant, followed him to his house, and 
determined by using the beeper that the ether was inside the house where it was then 
monitored. Id. at 708–09. After being moved to various locations, the agents determined 
that the can with the beeper in it was inside a house rented by the defendants and 
obtained a warrant to search the house based in part on information derived through use 
of the beeper. Id. at 709–10. 
157 Id. at 712. 
158 Id. 
159 See supra notes 152–54 and accompanying text. 
160 Karo, 468 U.S. at 714. 
161 See id. at 715. 
162 See id. 
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alone may have been enough to witness the ether entering the resi-
dence, the beeper confirmed what law enforcement saw and the 
continual monitoring of the beeper provided verification that the 
beeper had not left the residence.163 Thus, the case is not like 
Knotts, where the beeper only provided information that could 
have also been obtained through visual surveillance.164 In Karo, the 
monitoring indicated a fact that could not have been obtained 
through visual surveillance—that the beeper was inside the 
house.165 
Based upon this reasoning, the Court held that the Government 
cannot: 
[B]e completely free from the constraints of the 
Fourth Amendment to determine by means of an 
electronic device, without a warrant and without 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, whether a 
particular article—or a person, for that matter—is 
in an individual’s home at a particular time. Indi-
scriminate monitoring of property that has been 
withdrawn from public view would present far too 
serious a threat to privacy interests in the home to 
escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment 
oversight.166 
It does not matter that a warrant requirement in this situation 
would require the government to get warrants in a large number of 
cases167 nor does it matter that it will be difficult to meet the Fourth 
Amendment’s particularity requirement in such instances.168 The 
search of a house must be conducted with a warrant.169 
                                                                                                                            
163 Id. 
164 See supra notes 146–49 and accompanying text. 
165 See Karo, 468 U.S. at 715. 
166 Id. at 716. 
167 See id. at 718. The prosecution argued that “[i]f agents are required to obtain 
warrants prior to monitoring a beeper when it has been withdrawn from public 
view . . . for all practical purposes they will be forced to obtain warrants in every case in 
which they seek to use a beeper, because they have no way of knowing in advance whether 
the beeper will be transmitting its signals from inside private premises.” Id. The Court 
found this argument to be hardly compelling. See id. 
168 See id. The prosecution also argued that “it would be impossible to describe the 
‘place’ to be searched, because the location of the place is precisely what is sought to be 
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The final and most recent case on the use of a tracking device is 
United States v. Jones.170 Again, the facts are very similar to Knotts 
and Karo.171 The Court found that “the attachment of a [GPS] 
tracking device to an individual’s vehicle, and subsequent use of 
that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets, 
constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment.”172 The different outcome is a result of the analysis em-
ployed by the majority of the Court. Justice Scalia, writing for the 
majority, focused on the trespass involved with the placing of the 
beeper and declared that “the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law 
trespassory test.”173 Therefore, because “the government physical-
                                                                                                                            
discovered through the search. However true that may be, it will still be possible to 
describe the object into which the beeper is to be placed, the circumstances that led 
agents to wish to install the beeper, and the length of time for which beeper surveillance is 
requested. In our view, this information will suffice to permit issuance of a warrant 
authorizing beeper installation and surveillance.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see also 
infra Section III.D (discussing the issues presented by the particularity requirement). 
169 See id. 
170 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
171 Jones . . . was made the target of an investigation . . . . Officers 
employed various investigative techniques, including visual 
surveillance of the nightclub, installation of a camera focused on the 
front door of the club, and a pen register and wiretap covering Jones’s 
cellular phone. 
Based in part on information gathered from these sources, in 
2005 the Government applied . . . for a warrant authorizing the use of 
an electronic tracking device on the [vehicle] registered to Jones’s 
wife. A warrant issued, authorizing installation of the device in the 
District of Columbia and within [ten] days. 
On the [eleventh] day, and not in the District of Columbia but in 
Maryland, agents installed a GPS tracking device on the 
undercarriage of the Jeep while it was parked in a public parking lot. 
Over the next [twenty-eight] days, the Government used the device 
to track the vehicle’s movements, and once had to replace the 
device’s battery when the vehicle was parked in a different public lot 
in Maryland. By means of signals from multiple satellites, the device 
established the vehicle’s location within [fifty] to [one hundred] feet, 
and communicated that location by cellular phone to a Government 
computer. It relayed more than 2,000 pages of data over the [four]–
week period. 
Id. at 948. 
172 Id. at 948, 954. 
173 Id. at 952. 
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ly occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining informa-
tion,” the Court had no doubt that such an intrusion was a 
“search” within the original meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment.174 The Katz test remains applicable to “[s]ituations involv-
ing merely the transmission of electronic signals without tres-
pass.”175 
Knotts is distinguishable from Jones because Knotts only con-
ducted a Katz analysis, there was no challenge to the physical in-
stallation of the beeper, and the Court declined to consider the in-
stallation’s effect on its Fourth Amendment analysis.176 However, 
the conclusion in Karo—that installation with the consent of the 
original owner, then delivered to a buyer having no knowledge of 
the beeper, does not constitute a search—was determined to be 
consistent with the Court’s holding in Jones.177 
It is important to note that Justice Scalia and the three justices 
who joined the majority opinion did not find it necessary to deter-
mine whether or not using strictly electronic surveillance over a 
four-week period, which may have been possible through tradition-
al, visual observation, without an accompanying trespass is an un-
constitutional search.178 While Justice Sotomayor agreed that the 
trespassory analysis should be employed first and that its analysis 
alone was sufficient to decide this case,179 she also recognized and 
agreed with Justice Alito’s concurrence, joined by three other jus-
tices, finding that “physical intrusion is now unnecessary to many 
                                                                                                                            
174 Id. at 949. 
175 Id. at 953. 
176 See id. at 952. The Court found that Knotts might have been applicable “if the 
government were making the argument that what would otherwise be an unconstitutional 
search is not such where it produces only public information. The government does not 
make that argument, and we know of no case that would support it.” Id. 
177 See id. (“Karo accepted the container as it came to him, beeper and all, and was 
therefore not entitled to object to the beeper’s presence, even though it was used to 
monitor the container’s location.”). 
178 See id. at 953–54. 
179 See id. at 954–55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“The government usurped Jones’ 
property for the purpose of conducting surveillance on him, thereby invading privacy 
interests long afforded, and undoubtedly entitled to, Fourth Amendment protection . . . . 
[T]he trespassory test applied in the majority’s opinion reflects an irreducible 
constitutional minimum: when the government physically invades personal property to 
gather information, a search occurs. The reaffirmation of that principle suffices to decide 
this case.”). 
1024 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:995 
 
forms of surveillance” and “at the very least, ‘longer term GPS 
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expecta-
tions of privacy.’”180 
Justice Alito’s approach made a Katz analysis similar to those 
done in Knotts181 and Karo.182 Justice Alito reasoned that in most 
cases, long term GPS monitoring infringes upon reasonable expec-
tations of privacy, as society has long held the belief that law en-
forcement would not have the resources to discreetly monitor a 
person’s every movement.183 The exact point at which the moni-
toring became a search in this case is not necessary to determine as 
that “line was surely crossed before the four-week mark,” although 
“[o]ther cases may present more difficult questions.”184 In those 
situations where it is not clear whether or not GPS surveillance will 
amount to a Fourth Amendment search, the police can always play 
it safe by getting a warrant first.185 
This shows that a majority of the Supreme Court (through the 
majority and concurrence opinions) deemed the duration of the 
GPS monitoring as a critical factor in their analysis due to the fact 
that no reasonable person would expect law enforcement to use the 
resources necessary to conduct such a long surveillance through 
traditional means.186 GPS surveillance intrudes on expectations of 
privacy because the information in its totality reveals intimate de-
tails of a person’s life.187 This line of reasoning is an articulation of 
the mosaic theory. 
                                                                                                                            
180 Id. at 955 (quoting id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring)). 
181 See supra notes 152–54 and accompanying text. 
182 See supra notes 160–65 and accompanying text. 
183 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
184 See id. 
185 See id. 
186 See id. at 956. (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“And because GPS monitoring is cheap 
in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds 
surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement 
practices: ‘limited police resources and community hostility.’”); supra notes 183–85 and 
accompanying text. 
187 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
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D. The Mosaic Theory 
The mosaic theory188 holds that “the aggregation of vast 
amounts of metadata should be considered a ‘search’ within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it can reveal a great 
deal about a person’s life, even if each piece of data may reveal lit-
tle when viewed in isolation.”189 It provides an opportunity for the 
courts to protect against the privacy intrusions presented by the 
ever-evolving technological landscape in the era of big data.190 Un-
der this theory, a court would determine Fourth Amendment in-
terests on a case-by-case basis, “assessing the quality and quantity 
of information about a suspect gathered in the course of a specific 
investigation.”191 
Justice Sotomayor in Jones, while not explicitly using the term 
“mosaic theory,” suggested that the Court may need to adopt such 
an approach in the near future.192 She forewarned that the Court 
would eventually need to recognize the growing concern of how 
easily technology enables law enforcement to acquire personal in-
                                                                                                                            
188 While the Supreme Court justices never explicitly used the term “mosaic theory” in 
Jones, the Court of Appeals used this term. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 
562 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“As with the ‘mosaic theory’ often invoked by the government in 
cases involving national security information, ‘What may seem trivial to the uninformed, 
may appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene.’ Prolonged 
surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by short-term surveillance, such as 
what a person does repeatedly, what he does not do, and what he does ensemble. These 
types of information can each reveal more about a person than does any individual trip 
viewed in isolation. Repeated visits to a church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not 
told by any single visit, as does one’s not visiting any of these places over the course of a 
month. The sequence of a person’s movements can reveal still more; a single trip to a 
gynecologist’s office tells little about a woman, but that trip followed a few weeks later by 
a visit to a baby supply store tells a different story. A person who knows all of another’s 
travels can deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the 
gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an associate of 
particular individuals or political groups—and not just one such fact about a person, but 
all such facts.” (internal citations omitted)). 
189 Jonathan Hafetz, Bulk Data Collection and the Mosaic Theory: A More Balanced 
Approach to Information, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 17, 2014, 9:00 AM), https://www.just 
security.org/5758/guest-post-bulk-data-collection-mosaic-theory/ 
[https://perma.cc/RAG2-JYWC]. 
190 Id. 
191 David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 
62, 101 (2013). 
192 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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formation and how such unrestrained power is susceptible to abuse 
by the government.193 She specifically mentioned that physical in-
trusion is no longer necessary to conduct GPS tracking because 
GPS-enabled smartphones permit law enforcement to conduct 
non-trespassory surveillance.194 Law enforcement’s ability to ascer-
tain information about a person, including his political affiliation, 
religion, and sexual habits, through the sum of his public move-
ments should be taken into account in determining a person’s ex-
pectation of privacy.195 
Justice Alito used a similar line of reasoning in Jones, stating 
that “society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents 
and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could 
not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an 
individual’s car for a very long period.”196 He was specifically con-
cerned about the ease in which the tracking occurred and how it 
was continuous and precise.197 Essentially, Justice Alito suggested 
the adoption of the mosaic theory through his concern with how 
much information the continuous tracking revealed—indicating 
five Justices on the Supreme Court may be ready to adopt the mo-
saic theory.198 
Two years later, in Riley v. California, the Court held that po-
lice generally cannot search an arrestee’s cell phone at the time of 
an arrest without obtaining a warrant.199 Explaining why the arres-
tee’s wallet could be searched but his cell phone could not be, the 
Court offered an argument resembling the mosaic theory: 
[A] cell phone collects in one place many distinct 
types of information—an address, a note, a pre-
scription, a bank statement, a video—that reveal 
much more in combination than any isolated 
                                                                                                                            
193 See id. at 956. 
194 See id. at 955. 
195 See id. at 955–56. 
196 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
197 See id. at 963–64. 
198 Justice Sotomayor in her concurrence in Jones, along with Justice Alito’s 
concurrence in the same case, joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice 
Kagan, indicate a willingness by the Court to adopt the mosaic theory. See text 
accompanying supra notes 192, 196–97. 
199 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014). 
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record. . . . The sum of an individual’s private life 
can be reconstructed through a thousand photo-
graphs labeled with dates, locations, and descrip-
tions; the same cannot be said of a photograph or 
two of loved ones tucked into a wallet. [Finally], the 
data on a phone can date back to the purchase of the 
phone, or even earlier. A person might carry in his 
pocket a slip of paper reminding him to call Mr. 
Jones; he would not carry a record of all his com-
munications with Mr. Jones for the past several 
months, as would routinely be kept on a phone.200 
The Court also echoed Justice Sotomayor’s concern about cell 
phone location data in that it can be used to reconstruct someone’s 
movements down to the minute and within a specific building, re-
flecting intimate details of that person’s life.201 Riley provides us 
with hints that nearly all of the Justices may be open to mosaic 
theory reasoning in regards to the Fourth Amendment.202 This can 
be seen as an important recognition by the Court as a way to pro-
tect the public from advances in technology. Another is laid out in 
Kyllo v. United States.203 
E. The Advance of Technology and the Court’s Response 
Advances in technology, such as the Stingray, have made intru-
sions into the home easier and affected the degree of privacy se-
cured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment.204 Prior to the advent 
of smartphones, iPads, and every other technological innovation 
that has shaped the world we live in today, the greatest safeguards 
to our privacy were not found in the Constitution but were practic-
                                                                                                                            
200 Id. at 2489. But see id. at 2489 n.1 (“Because the United States and California agree 
that these cases involve searches incident to arrest, these cases do not implicate the 
question whether the collection or inspection of aggregated digital information amounts 
to a search under other circumstances.”). 
201 See id. at 2490 (citing Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)). 
202 Every Justice but Justice Alito, who filed a concurring opinion, joined Chief Justice 
Robert’s opinion. See id. at 2480 (majority opinion). 
203 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
204 See id. at 33–34. 
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al.205 Maintaining surveillance through conventional means over a 
long period of time was costly and laborious and therefore rarely 
done.206 Technological advances have made what used to take “a 
large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assis-
tance . . . relatively easy and cheap.”207 Society’s reasonable expec-
tations of privacy will be continually transformed and shaped ac-
cording to the accessibility and use of these advances.208 A new 
surveillance technique, such as Stingrays, must be “judged by ba-
lancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment inter-
ests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”209 
Kyllo v. United States put these expectations to the test. In this 
case, agents used a thermal-imaging device to scan the defendant’s 
home to ascertain whether or not the heat measurements coming 
from the home were consistent with levels given from the sort of 
lamps typically used for indoor marijuana growth.210 Based in part 
on the results of the scan showing that parts of the home were 
warmer than others, a Federal Magistrate Judge issued a warrant to 
search the defendant’s home where agents found marijuana grow-
ing.211 The Court ultimately held that: 
[O]btaining by sense-enhancing technology any in-
formation regarding the interior of the home that 
could not otherwise have been obtained without 
physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected 
area constitutes a search—at least where (as here) 
the technology in question is not in general public 
use. This assures preservation of that degree of pri-
vacy against government that existed when the 
Fourth Amendment was adopted.212 
In order to get to this conclusion, the Court first rejected re-
cognizing a difference between “off-the-wall” observations and 
                                                                                                                            
205 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring); see also Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616, 628 (1886) (“[T]he eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass.”). 
206 See id. 
207 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64. 
208 Id. at 963. 
209 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979). 
210 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001). 
211 See id. at 30. 
212 Id. at 34 (internal citations omitted). 
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“through-the-wall surveillance.”213 The fact that thermal imaging 
only detects heat radiating from the exterior of the house is imma-
terial because recognizing such a difference would “leave the 
homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology—including im-
aging technology that could discern all human activity in the 
home.”214 The “proposition that inference insulates a search” 
must be rejected as well because it is contrary to Karo, “where the 
police ‘inferred’ from the activation of a beeper that a certain can 
of ether was in the home.”215 
The next argument made by the government was that the 
thermal imaging was constitutional because it did not detect private 
activities occurring in private areas.216 Supreme Court cases show 
that all details are intimate details when inside the home though,217 
so the detail of how warm—or even how relatively warm—Kyllo 
was heating his residence is also an intimate detail because it is in 
his home.218 Therefore, because all details are intimate details 
when inside the home and the Government used a device, not in 
general public use, to procure information inside the home that 
could not have been knowable without physical intrusion, the sur-
veillance is a “search” and is presumptively unreasonable without 
a warrant.219 
The dissent points out two fair criticisms. First, the majority 
does not discuss how much use constitutes general public use.220 
The dissent was the first of many to criticize this portion of the 
opinion.221 Unfortunately, this portion of the standard has not be-
                                                                                                                            
213 See id. at 35. 
214 Id. at 35–36. 
215 Id. at 36. 
216 See id. at 38. 
217 For example, a can of ether and the registration number of a phonograph turntable 
have been found to be intimate details when inside a home. See generally Arizona v. Hicks, 
480 U.S. 321 (1987); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
218 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38. 
219 Id. at 40. 
220 See id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
221 See, e.g., Mary Kim, Investigation and Police Practices, 90 GEO. L.J. 1099 (2002); 
Daniel McKenzie, What Were They Smoking?: The Supreme Court’s Latest Step In A Long, 
Strange Trip Through The Fourth Amendment, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 153 (2002); 
Reginald Short, Comment, The Kyllo Conundrum: A New Standard to Address Technology 
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come any clearer. Since the standards were first articulated, no 
thermal imaging device has been declared “in general public use” 
and therefore free to be used without a warrant.222 Federal courts 
have avoided even attempting to interpret this portion of the stan-
dard and instead have simply decided cases without commenting 
specifically on the “general public use” portion of the standard.223 
The second main criticism by the dissent was that “the catego-
ry of ‘sense-enhancing technology’ covered by the new rule is far 
too broad.”224 Justice Stevens argued that this rule would prohibit 
mechanical substitutes for dog sniffs despite the fact that the Court 
had already held that “a dog sniff that ‘discloses only the presence 
or absence of narcotics’ does ‘not constitute a “search” within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.’”225 This fear proved to be 
unfounded when, in Illinois v. Caballes, the Court reasoned that it 
was critical to the Kyllo decision that the device was capable of de-
tecting lawful activity, whereas a dog sniff can only detect unlawful 
activity.226 There is an accepted, reasonable expectation that pri-
vate, lawful activity will remain private, but that assumption is in-
apposite to the expectation that contraband in the trunk of your car 
will also remain private.227 Therefore, the Court concluded that 
“[a] dog sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop that reveals no 
information other than the location of a substance that no individu-
al has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment.”228 
                                                                                                                            
That Represents A Step Backward For Fourth Amendment Protections, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 
463, 482–83 (2002). 
222 Derek T. Conom, Sense-Enhancing Technology and the Search in the Wake of Kyllo v. 
United States: Will Prevalence Kill Privacy?, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 749, 765 (2005). 
223 See Conom, supra note 222, at 765; see also Baldi v. Amadon, No. CIV. 02-313-M, 
2004 WL 725618, at *4 (D.N.H. Apr. 5, 2004) (distinguishing Kyllo and the general 
public use standard by instead holding that since the scan with the night vision was done 
outside Baldi’s curtilage and in the open fields of the area, MacKenzie did not see 
anything “regarding the interior of the home that could not have been otherwise obtained 
without physical intrusion”). 
224 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
225 Id. (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)). 
226 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409–10 (2005). 
227 Id. at 410. 
228 Id. 
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III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S IMPLICATIONS ON THE 
USE OF A STINGRAY BY LAW ENFORCEMENT 
This Part discusses the Fourth Amendment implications of the 
use of a Stingray, and concludes that the Fourth Amendment re-
quires, at minimum, law enforcement to obtain a warrant prior to 
using a Stingray. Section III.A discusses modern Fourth Amend-
ment cases dealing with different surveillance techniques and the 
protection of the home versus public places. Section III.B explains 
how the use of a Stingray is a Fourth Amendment search under a 
traditional Katz analysis. Then, Section III.C distinguishes how the 
real-time tracking of cell phone location data is different from his-
torical cell phone location data. Lastly, Section III.D discusses the 
possibility that use of Stingrays should be banned altogether be-
cause approval to use one may equate to a general warrant. 
A. Warrantless Searches and the Courts’ Responses 
While it is clear that the Framers of the Constitution could not 
have predicted modern law enforcement needs,229 the discretionary 
authority of officers today is far greater than what the Framers 
could have ever imagined or wanted.230 This Section first discusses 
how courts have reacted to the different surveillance methods and 
techniques used by modern law enforcement and the applicability 
of these decisions to a Stingray; particularly sense-enhancing tech-
nology and real-time tracking of automobiles. It then closes with 
the modern view of the Supreme Court on the “mosaic theory” 
and its applicability to Stingray use. 
1. The Court’s Protection of the Home from Sense-
Enhancing Technology 
People have always been able to be “free from unreasonable 
governmental intrusion” under the protection of their own 
home.231 One’s home is a place where an “individual normally ex-
                                                                                                                            
229 See Nathan H. Seltzer, When History Matters Not: The Fourth Amendment in the Age of 
the Secret Search, 40 NO. 2 CRIM. LAW BULL. ART 1 (Summer 2004). 
230 Davies, supra note 114, at 557. 
231 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 
365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). The Court re-affirmed this statement in Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001). 
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pects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a 
warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared 
to recognize as justifiable.”232 As such, without a warrant, the gov-
ernment cannot use surveillance devices to determine whether or 
not a particular item, like a cell phone, or a person, is in a private 
residence.233 The “[i]ndiscriminate monitoring of property [within 
one’s home] . . . present[s] far too serious a threat to privacy inter-
ests . . . to escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment over-
sight.”234 
It does not matter that law enforcement agencies will not know 
when they are monitoring devices in a private place, thus compel-
ling them to obtain a warrant in almost all cases.235 Nor does it mat-
ter that they may not be able to depict the “place” they are trying 
to search, because the location is what they are after.236 This per-
fectly articulates why the use of a Stingray would intrude on a per-
son’s reasonable expectation of privacy in nearly all situations. Law 
enforcement typically uses Stingrays to find suspects whose loca-
tions they do not know, and therefore may track them into private 
places.237 As a result, law enforcement must be required to obtain a 
warrant prior to its use of a Stingray or risk violating the Fourth 
Amendment. The federal government admitted as much in a failed 
defense in Karo.238 
This potential for an invasion of privacy has only increased with 
the advance of technology and when new technologies come before 
a court they are typically analyzed through a Kyllo analysis.239 Ap-
plying such an analysis to Stingrays supports the inference that 
Stingrays, like thermal imaging devices, should also be found to be 
                                                                                                                            
232 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984). 
233 Id. at 716. 
234 Id. 
235 See id. at 718. 
236 Id. 
237 See text accompanying supra note 30. 
238 The federal government argued in Karo that requiring a warrant prior to monitoring 
a beeper in a private residence would require them to obtain a warrant in almost all 
situations. Karo, 468 U.S. at 718. Since the location is precisely what agents are after, it is 
impossible for agents to predict whether the beeper will be at some point transmitting its 
signals from inside private premises. See id.; supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
239 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
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a search under the Fourth Amendment. A main concern of the 
Court in Kyllo was protecting the home from “advancing technolo-
gy.”240 This is why even a mere inference from the use of technol-
ogy that produces information on the interior of a home is still con-
sidered a search.241 Therefore, use of a Stingray that goes through 
walls to produce information on the interior of a home, such infor-
mation being an inference that the suspect will be in the home next 
to his cell phone,242 should surely be found to be a search as well.243 
The fact that the information produced is only an inference is im-
material.244 Nor does it matter that the information produced is 
merely the location of a cell phone—if a phonograph table, a can of 
ether, and how warm a house is are considered intimate details of a 
home,245 the location of a cell phone within a home is assuredly an 
intimate detail as well. 
As for the criticisms of Kyllo concerning the “general public 
use” standard and the potential for the category of “sense-
enhancing technology” that is covered by the new rule being too 
broad,246 they do not present much of a problem in regards to Stin-
grays. Stingrays cannot be considered in general public use because 
the public barely knows anything about them and are actively pre-
                                                                                                                            
240 See id. at 35–36, 40. 
241 See id. at 36. 
242 See, e.g., Matthew Keys, Sting Operation: Police Tracked Cellphones with ‘Stingrays,’ 
BLOT MAG. (June 5, 2014), http://www.theblot.com/documents-reveal-police-track-cell-
phones-stingrays-7720535 [https://perma.cc/YV6H-Z2BF] (reporting that the police 
used a Stingray to find and force themselves into a suspect’s apartment without a 
warrant); Kim Zetter, Secrets of FBI Smartphone Surveillance Tool Revealed in Court Fight, 
WIRED (Apr. 9, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2013/04/verizon-rigmaiden-
aircard/ [https://perma.cc/5B66-ZLFC] (reporting that the FBI used a Stingray to find 
the suspect in apartment 1122). 
243 A potential counter is that the agents will have “probable cause to believe that 
incriminating evidence will be found within” the home, such as a wanted suspect. Payton 
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 588 (1980). The Court shot down this argument because “the 
constitutional protection afforded to the individual’s interest in the privacy of his own 
home is equally applicable to a warrantless entry for the purpose of arresting a resident of 
the house; for it is inherent in such an entry that a search for the suspect may be required 
before he can be apprehended.” Id. 
244 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 36. 
245 See text accompanying supra notes 217–18. 
246 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting); text accompanying supra notes 
220, 224. 
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vented from learning more.247 Additionally, only sixty-one state 
and federal agencies are known to use Stingrays248 as compared to 
the thermal imaging device at issue in Kyllo, which had nearly one 
thousand manufactured units.249 On top of that, the device in Kyllo 
could be rented by anyone who wanted one from several national 
companies, was predated by a device which had anywhere from 
4,000 to 5,000 units, and had a competitor ranging from 5,000 to 
6,000 units.250 If the device in Kyllo was found to not be in general 
public use, then clearly Stingrays are in even less general public 
use. 
Were Stingrays to get to a point that they could arguably be 
considered in general public use, then courts may finally be forced 
to address this language. Federal courts have been reluctant to ana-
lyze what constitutes “general public use” so far,251 while states 
may avoid the question altogether by formulating their own stan-
dards based upon their state constitutions.252 Relying upon the 
more protective terms of their own constitutions, states may in-
stead decide on the issue by relying upon a privacy analysis that 
does not incorporate the objective expectations of society into it,253 
or simply leave out the general public use language in a similar 
adoption of Kyllo. As for the federal courts, the blind affirmation of 
the public use standard needs to come to an end.254 Whatever op-
tions the lower courts select in providing meaning to the language 
“will ultimately and inevitably lead to further consideration by the 
Supreme Court regarding this question,”255 but until then, district 
courts need to attempt to provide clarification. 
                                                                                                                            
247 See supra Section I.A. 
248 See Who’s Got Them, supra note 3. 
249 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
250 Id. 
251 See Conom, supra note 222, at 765. 
252 See id. at 766; see also State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 601 (Wash. 1994) (“We hold the 
infrared surveillance not only violated the defendant’s private affairs, but also constituted 
a violation of the Washington State Constitution’s protection against the warrantless 
invasion of his home.”). 
253 Conom, supra note 222, at 773. “In Young, the Washington Supreme Court found 
both the private affairs clause and invasion of the home clause [of their state constitution] 
violated.” Id. at 768. 
254 See Conom, supra note 222, at 773. 
255 Id. 
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As to the second criticism of Kyllo, that the standard was far 
too broad,256 its concern is unfounded here relying upon the rea-
soning laid out in Illinois v. Caballes.257 Simply having a cell phone 
on your person is lawful activity258 and very different than a dog 
sniff or any other future surveillance technique that is only capable 
of procuring unlawful activity. Therefore, because a Stingray is not 
in general public use at the moment and it detects legal activity, 
when the use of one produces information inside a private resi-
dence that was not knowable without the use of the device, in that 
instance it should be considered a search under the Fourth 
Amendment. Much of this line of analysis is confirmed and sup-
plemented by GPS tracking cases. 
2. Tracking People in Public Areas with Stingrays is Also a 
Search 
Looking at the real-time tracking cases259 together provides 
another useful indicator on how courts could analyze the use of 
Stingrays if they were to accept the opportunity. First, it appears a 
court would apply a Katz analysis because Stingrays involve no 
physical trespass but an electronic one.260 If the use of a Stingray is 
found to have procured information from inside a private resi-
dence, that ends the analysis because the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects one’s home.261 It does not matter that electronic surveillance 
is less intrusive than traditional means—the Fourth Amendment 
protects the information a search reveals inside a home and a court 
cannot abandon the notion of being free from government intrusion 
just because a search is less intrusive.262 
                                                                                                                            
256 See text accompanying supra note 224. 
257 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409–10 (1983); supra text accompanying notes 
226–28. 
258 “[N]early three-quarters of smart phone users report being within five feet of their 
phones most of the time . . . .” Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014); see also 
Lee Rainie & Kathryn Zickuhr, Americans’ Views on Mobile Etiquette, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 
26, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/08/26/americans-views-on-mobile-
etiquette/ [https://perma.cc/D6KK-AUQ5]. 
259 See supra Part II.C. 
260 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012). 
261 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984). 
262 See Karo, 468 U.S. at 715 (“The monitoring of an electronic device such as a beeper 
is, of course, less intrusive than a full-scale search, but it does reveal a critical fact about 
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If the search never intruded into a private place, which is very 
unlikely as the average American spends sixty nine percent of his or 
her time in a residence,263 a court will likely then ask whether the 
surveillance done by the Stingray could have reasonably been done 
through traditional, visual surveillance as a way to determine the 
reasonableness of the search.264 With a Stingray, the user is often 
trying to find a suspect’s location. That means law enforcement 
does not have a car to place a tracking device on nor the means to 
conduct traditional surveillance methods, such as tracking the car 
by simply following it. Therefore, even if a suspect is tracked in and 
to public places, the tracking was only made possible through the 
use of the Stingray and should still be considered an illegal search. 
Such tracking of people in public places also impinges on ex-
pectations of privacy under the mosaic theory. Since Stingrays al-
low for the continuous, precise tracking of a person, it is, therefore, 
a very real concern that law enforcement may use a Stingray to ob-
tain an aggregate of information that paints an intimate portrait of a 
person’s life. When law enforcement uses a Stingray to follow an 
individual, whose cell phone number they do not have, to various 
locations in order to determine the targeted individual’s number, 
the police create a powerful social and behavioral analysis map that 
will not only reveal the intimate details of the targeted person but 
also of innocent people who live and interact around those loca-
                                                                                                                            
the interior of the premises that the government is extremely interested in knowing and 
that it could not have otherwise obtained without a warrant.”). 
263 See Neil E. Klepeis et al., The National Human Activity Pattern Survey (NHAPS): A 
Resource for Assessing Exposure to Environmental Pollutants, 11 J. OF EXPOSURE ANALYSIS 
AND ENVTL. EPIDEMIOLOGY 231, 239 (2001), http://www.nature.com/jes/journal/v11/ 
n3/pdf/7500165a.pdf [https://perma.cc/JN9E-VVVQ]. 
264 Even though the majority in Jones did not employ such a technique, the opinion did 
indicate were they to have employed a Katz analysis, they would have looked at whether 
the electronic surveillance could have been done through traditional means. See Jones, 132 
S. Ct. at 953–54 (“Thus, even assuming that the concurrence is correct to say that 
‘[t]raditional surveillance’ of Jones for a four-week period ‘would have required a large 
team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance,’ our cases suggest that 
such visual observation is constitutionally permissible. It may be that achieving the same 
result through electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an 
unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present case does not require us to answer 
that question.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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tions.265 One U.S. Magistrate Judge has already taken note of this 
issue and has prohibited federal agents from using Stingrays when 
“an inordinate number of innocent third parties’ information will 
be collected.”266 Judge Iain Johnston stated the devices are “simp-
ly too powerful” and invasive “to allow its use without specific au-
thorization from a fully informed court.”267 
In the scenarios where the police are tracking an individual 
whose cell phone number they do have, the mosaic theory may not 
be as applicable because law enforcement will presumably not track 
them for as long and, therefore, not obtain as much information. 
Nonetheless, the concern remains that law enforcement may give 
in to the temptation to use a Stingray because of how easy it makes 
the tracking of suspects, resulting in “abuse, overreach, or misuse” 
by law enforcement.268 This potential abuse of authority by law en-
forcement is the twenty-first century version of the fear that the 
Framers had and why they wanted to curb the discretionary author-
ity of officers.269 Additionally, the public does not agree that the 
length of the tracking should be the decisive factor in deciding a 
reasonable expectation of privacy on the real-time tracking of an 
individual’s cell phone.270 Society is prepared to recognize that the 
short term tracking of a person’s location is a violation as well. 
B. A Traditional Katz Analysis 
This Part conducts a traditional Katz analysis of the use of 
Stingray devices. It argues first that society is prepared to recognize 
an expectation of privacy in real-time cell phone location data, and 
second that people actually have such an expectation. 
                                                                                                                            
265 See AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION MICH., A TASTE OF ITS OWN MEDICINE: MICHIGAN 
HOLDS FIRST PUBLIC HEARING ON SECRETIVE HAILSTORM AND STINGRAY SURVEILLANCE 
DEVICES 3 (2014), http://www.aclumich.org/sites/default/files/ATasteOfItsOwn 
Medicine_Hailstorm_Stingray_Surveillance_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZKK-D94E] 
[hereinafter ACLU Michigan Stingray Report]. 
266 In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Relating to 
Telephones Used by Suppressed, No. 15 M 0021, 2015 WL 6871289, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 
9, 2015) [hereinafter Cell-Site Simulator Use Order]. 
267 Id. at *4. 
268 ACLU Michigan Stingray Report, supra note 265, at 3. 
269 See Davies, supra note 114, at 578. 
270 See text accompanying infra note 280. 
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1. People Have an Objective Expectation of Privacy in Their 
Real-Time Cell Phone Location Data 
Harlan’s concurrence in Katz requires that for Fourth 
Amendment protection an expectation of privacy must “be one 
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”271 There-
fore, we must determine if society is prepared to recognize the real-
time tracking of a person’s location through his cell phone (i.e., use 
of a Stingray) as reasonable or to be a violation of that person’s ex-
pectation of privacy. 
The Supreme Court recognizes that society is concerned about 
the government’s increasing use of electronic surveillance.272 Nine-
ty-two percent of Americans own cell phones and ninety percent of 
those users say their phone is frequently with them273—meaning 
law enforcement could track eighty-three percent of Americans 
with a Stingray on a daily basis if they wanted to. Forty-six percent 
of smartphone users say they couldn’t live without their phones.274 
The Court recognizes that: 
Modern cell phones are not just another technologi-
cal convenience. With all they . . . may reveal, they 
hold for many Americans “the privacies of life.” 
The fact that technology now allows an individual to 
carry such information in his hand does not make 
the information any less worthy of the protection for 
which the Founders fought.275 
The Court has already found that there is an expectation of pri-
vacy in telephone conversations conducted in public phone 
                                                                                                                            
271 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
272 See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Awareness that the 
Government may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms.”); United 
States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 312 (1972) (stating 
that the employment of electronic surveillance by government causes “a deep-seated 
uneasiness and apprehension that this capability will be used to intrude upon the 
cherished privacy of law-abiding citizens”). 
273 See Rainie & Zickuhr, supra note 258. 
274 See Monica Anderson, 6 Facts About Americans and Their Smartphones, PEW RES. 
CTR. (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/04/01/6-facts-about-
americans-and-their-smartphones/ [https://perma.cc/45GY-4QBD]. 
275 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494–95 (2014) (internal citations omitted). 
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booths276 and the Sixth Circuit, relying upon principles laid out in 
Katz, found a reasonable expectation of privacy in emails as well.277 
The Sixth Circuit has recognized that “the Fourth Amendment 
must keep pace with the inexorable march of technological 
progress, or its guarantees will wither and perish.”278 The use of 
Stingrays is precisely the kind of situation where the Fourth 
Amendment must keep pace with technology or we risk losing its 
protection altogether. Therefore, there needs to be a recognition of 
an objective expectation of privacy in real-time cell phone location 
data, especially when obtained through surveillance techniques that 
could not have been conducted without the use of the device. 
Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones suggests that such an ex-
pectation will only be reasonable if it is over a long period of time 
because the duration of the tracking is the decisive factor.279 The 
public simply does not agree with this opinion. In a study about 
Americans’ privacy expectations, the results show that the percen-
tage of respondents who believed that surveillance either definitely 
or likely violated a reasonable expectation of privacy rose by just 
three percentage points when the surveillance’s duration was de-
scribed as month-long rather than day-long.280 Therefore, the rela-
tive short term tracking that may occur with the typical use of a 
Stingray should not be of a concern to a court. People are just as 
worried about their location being tracked for a day as they are for a 
month. 
                                                                                                                            
276 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (majority opinion). 
277 See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 289 (6th Cir. 2010). 
278 Id. at 285. 
279 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in 
judgment) (“[R]elatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on public 
streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society has recognized as 
reasonable.”). 
280 Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Surveillance Duration Doesn’t Affect 
Privacy Expectations: An Empirical Test of the Mosaic Theory 6 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law 
& Econ., Working Paper No. 727, 2015), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/view 
content.cgi?article=2419&context=law_and_economics [https://perma.cc/Q2KH-
5ERD]. The results went from 56% to 59% who believed tracking through GPS 
surveillance would definitely or likely violate a reasonable expectation of privacy, with 
25% and 24% respectively believing such tracking definitely or likely did not violate a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 34. 
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2. People Have a Subjective Expectation of Privacy in Their 
Real-Time Cell Phone Location Data 
In order to constitute a search under Harlan’s concurrence in 
Katz, a person must exhibit an actual or subjective expectation of 
privacy as well.281 Citizens are right to, and in fact do, assume that 
their belongings “are not infected with concealed electronic devic-
es.”282 This is precisely what a Stingray does though; it secretly 
forces a user’s phone to connect to it and then gathers the informa-
tion and location of the phone. Statistics support this inference as 
well—that people have an actual expectation of privacy in their 
phones and location. 
In a 2014 survey, 82% of people considered their physical loca-
tion to be sensitive material.283 In a separate survey, 85.5% of res-
pondents disagreed with Knotts, in which the Supreme Court 
upheld the warrantless installation of a tracking device on a ve-
hicle.284 Lastly, in a poll of Californians, 73% of the people favored 
“a law that required the police to convince a judge that a crime has 
been committed before obtaining location information from the cell 
phone company.”285 All of this indicates people have an actual ex-
pectation of privacy in their location and cell phones, despite what 
the Eleventh Circuit said in Davis. 
                                                                                                                            
281 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
282 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 735 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
283 See MARY MADDEN, PEW RES. CTR., PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY AND 
SECURITY IN THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA 34 (2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/ 
2014/11/PI_PublicPerceptionsofPrivacy_111214.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4Y6-6EE4] 
(noting that fifty percent of adults feel that their physical location data is “very sensitive” 
and that another thirty-two percent of adults consider this data “somewhat sensitive”). 
284 See Henry F. Fradella, et al., Quantifying Katz: Empirically Measuring “Reasonable 
Expectations of Privacy” in the Fourth Amendment Context, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 289, 366 
(2011). 
285 See Jennifer King & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Supermajority of Californians Supports 
Limits on Law Enforcement Access to Cell Location Information 8–9 (Apr. 18, 2008), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/beyond-voice-
mapping-mobile-marketplace-534331-00005/534331-00005.pdf [https://perma.cc/49J7-
5QM5]. 
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C. The Use of a Stingray is Different from the Acquisition of Historical 
Cell Tower Records 
The overarching difference between the Eleventh Circuit deci-
sion in Davis and the use of a Stingray is that when law enforce-
ment uses a Stingray, they are not obtaining historical location data 
but instead are tracking cell phones in real-time. The Davis court 
specifically mentioned that this case does not involve “real-time or 
prospective cell tower location information.”286 While historical 
cell site location data only shows the user’s “general vicinity,”287 
the tracking with a Stingray is precise. When looking at the step-by-
step analysis taken by the Davis court, it only further illustrates the 
differences between historical and real-time cell phone location da-
ta. 
The court’s first consideration in Davis was that cell phone us-
ers have no expectation of privacy in their historical cell site loca-
tions under the third party doctrine because cell phone users know 
when making a call that their phone has to connect to a cell 
tower.288 This changes with the use of a Stingray. When a Stingray 
is being used, a cell phone no longer connects to a cell tower but 
instead connects to the Stingray without alerting the user. The Da-
vis court also identified that cell phones only emit such a signal 
when a person makes or receives a call.289 This too changes when 
law enforcement uses a Stingray, as the device forces a connection 
with the phone even if no call is in progress. 
The third consideration in Davis was that people know their 
phone’s signal is sent to their service provider.290 As just men-
tioned, with a Stingray the phone’s signal is no longer being sent to 
a user’s service provider but instead to the Stingray device unkno-
wingly. In its final step, the Davis court determined that the cell 
phone user is aware that he is conveying cell tower location infor-
mation to the service provider, and voluntarily does so.291 In con-
trast, when a Stingray is in use, the cell phone user is not aware 
                                                                                                                            
286 See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 505 (11th Cir. 2015). 
287 See id. at 516. 
288 See id. at 511. 
289 See id. 
290 See id. 
291 See id. 
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that he is conveying his location to the Stingray device, nor is he 
voluntarily sending a cell signal to it at all; the Stingray forces the 
connection. Therefore, the third party doctrine that is so heavily 
relied upon in Davis is not applicable to Stingrays. 
D. Approval to Use a Stingray May Constitute a General Warrant 
In determining whether a particular government action violates 
the Fourth Amendment, a court is first to inquire “whether the 
action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the 
common law when the Amendment was framed.”292 The Fourth 
Amendment prohibits general warrants.293 The problem with gen-
eral warrants is not necessarily of an intrusion, but of “a general, 
exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.”294 This is exact-
ly what the Framers were concerned with when writing the Fourth 
Amendment and is addressed by the Amendments’ particularity 
requirement.295 
This would seem to suggest that Stingrays are in direct conflict 
with the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment because they 
gather information from every cell phone within their range, 
whether or not there is a warrant for each phone it forces a connec-
tion with.296 The particularity requirement requires a warrant to 
describe the person and things to be searched297 but this simply is 
                                                                                                                            
292 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999). 
293 See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976). 
294 Id. (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971)). 
295 See id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.” (emphasis added)). 
296 See Frank Knaack, Stingrays—Bringing Dragnet Surveillance to a Town Near You, AM. 
CIV. LIBERTIES UNION VA. (Sept. 26, 2014, 4:13 PM), https://acluva.org/16123/stingrays-
bringing-dragnet-surveillance-to-a-town-near-you/ [https://perma.cc/VRL4-8EZ5]. This 
article also suggests that use of a Stingray should be banned all together because of First 
Amendment concerns as well. Id. While the Supreme Court held in NAACP v. Alabama 
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), that the government “cannot force a private 
association to turn over its membership list to the government, the introduction of 
Stingrays has provided law enforcement with a tool to get around this constitutional 
limitation.” Knaack, supra. Law enforcement can stand near a meeting and collect 
information and identities from all nearby phones. Id. 
297 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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not possible because of the fact that a Stingray searches every 
phone near it, not just of the person or thing law enforcement de-
scribed in the warrant, were law enforcement to obtain one.298 
However, one problem with this historical approach is that be-
tween the 1990 and 2001 terms, the Supreme Court ruled on twen-
ty cases addressing the Fourth Amendment, yet only discussed the 
original meaning of the Amendment in four of these cases—
suggesting they do not always begin with a historical analysis.299 A 
second problem is that modern judges have struggled “in recount-
ing the content of framing-era law.”300 Nonetheless, a historical 
argument of the Fourth Amendment is one to consider when dis-
cussing the possibility that approval to use a Stingray may consti-
tute an illegal general warrant. 
Even if you were not to base an analysis on the historical under-
standing of the Fourth Amendment, at the core of the Amendment 
is the right for any person to be free from governmental intrusion in 
his own home.301 No warrant would allow the police to search every 
house in a neighborhood, but a Stingray allows the police to do just 
that.302 Police can use a Stingray to search “every home, vehicle, 
purse and pocket in a given area,”303 meaning that tens of thou-
sands of innocent bystanders can potentially have information from 
their phones taken by law enforcement without anyone being the 
                                                                                                                            
298 See Knaack, supra note 296. 
299 Seltzer, supra note 229. 
300 Davies, supra note 114, at 742 (“Justice Scalia repeated Chief Justice Taft’s 
historically false claim that the allowance of warrantless ship searches in the 1789 
Collections Act revealed the Framers’ understanding of the Fourth Amendment’s 
‘reasonableness’ standard. Likewise, Justice Thomas has recently mischaracterized a 
statement by Blackstone as though it were relevant to the knock-and-announce rule for 
serving warrants.”). 
301 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 
573, 589–90 (1980). 
302 See Fenton, supra note 106; see also Tim Cushing, Baltimore PD Hides Its Stingray 
Usage Under a Pen Register Order; Argues There’s Really No Difference Between The Two, 
TECHDIRT (Jan. 9, 2015, 6:10 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150103/ 
14461029590/baltimore-pd-hides-its-stingray-usage-under-pen-register-order-argues-
theres-really-no-difference-between-two.shtml [https://perma.cc/FR9N-LH8C] (noting 
that since a Stingray searches the phones of anyone in the vicinity, a warrant to use such a 
device at the very least is an illegal general search warrant). 
303 Fenton, supra note 106. 
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wiser.304 The fact that such a sweep may only pick up the identify-
ing information of bystanders’ cell phones does not matter because 
chances are that some of those bystanders will be in their homes, 
and all details in the home are intimate. 
Additionally, there is a concern that the federal government 
will collect these innocent bystanders’ numbers and then maintain 
those numbers in a database.305 Such third party bystanders have 
greater privacy interests and are provided with more safeguards 
from the courts than litigants though.306 In order to address this 
issue, one judge has limited the use of Stingrays, and in some situa-
tions banned their use altogether.307 Therefore, while it may be un-
likely that the use of a Stingray will be banned in all situations, they 
may be banned in certain situations on the basis that they are “fun-
damentally at odds with the Constitution.”308 
The legality of dragnet surveillance was recently looked at in 
American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper.309 In this case, the ACLU 
challenged the legality of the National Security Agency’s (“NSA”) 
telephone metadata310 collection program,311 arguing that the col-
                                                                                                                            
304 See Lisa Bartley, Investigation: Law Enforcement Use Secret ‘Stingray’ Devices to Track 
Cell Phone Signals, ABC7 (Dec. 3, 2014), http://abc7.com/news/investigation-law-
enforcement-use-secret-devices-to-track-cell-phone-signals/421190/ 
[https://perma.cc/M6N8-YQA9]. 
305 See Cell-Site Simulator Use Order, supra note 266, at *3. 
306 Id. 
307 Id. at *3–4. 
308 See Knaack, supra note 296. 
309 See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d. Cir. 2015). 
310 Telephone metadata are: 
[D]etails about telephone calls, including, for example, the length of a 
call, the phone number from which the call was made, and the phone 
number called. Metadata can also reveal the user or device making or 
receiving a call through unique “identity numbers” associated with 
the equipment . . . and provide information about the routing of a call 
through the telephone network, which can sometimes (although not 
always) convey information about a caller’s general location. 
According to the government, the metadata it collected did not 
include cell site locational information, which provides a more precise 
indication of a caller’s location than call-routing information does. 
Id. at 793–94. 
311 In this program, the NSA “collect[ed] in bulk ‘on an ongoing daily basis’ the 
metadata associated with telephone calls made by and to Americans, and aggregated those 
metadata into a repository or data bank that can later be queried.” Id. at 792. 
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lection program violated the Fourth Amendment.312 The Second 
Circuit found that the language of section 215 of the PATRIOT Act 
did not authorize the program.313 The court noted that the program 
was “shrouded in . . . secrecy . . . and only a limited subset of 
members of Congress had a comprehensive understanding of the 
program or of its purported legal bases.”314 Since there was “no 
opportunity for broad discussion in the Congress or among the 
public of whether the [federal government]’s interpretation of sec-
tion 215 was correct,” the program was not legislatively ratified.315 
Once the Second Circuit found the program to be illegal on statuto-
ry grounds, it did not rule on the constitutional issues.316 
One issue with using Clapper as a corollary to Stingray use is 
that Clapper involved the authorization of the collection of data 
from millions of people in the interest of national security and 
counter-terrorism,317 while Stingrays are typically used by state 
agencies to track anyone from killers to petty thieves and involve 
the alleged searches of tens of thousands of people, not millions. 
These are very different interests to be balanced by a court in 
weighing a person’s reasonable Fourth Amendment interests 
against the legitimate interests of the government. 
Nonetheless, the argument made by the ACLU in Clapper318 
provides an interesting theory and convinced the court to admit, in 
                                                                                                                            
312 See id. at 810. 
313 See id. at 818. 
314 Id. at 820. 
315 Id. at 821. 
316 See id. at 824. 
317 See generally id. 
318 Appellants argue that the telephone metadata program provides an 
archetypal example of the kind of technologically advanced 
surveillance techniques that, they contend, require a revision of the 
third-party records doctrine. Metadata today, as applied to individual 
telephone subscribers, particularly with relation to mobile phone 
services and when collected on an ongoing basis with respect to all of 
an individual’s calls (and not merely, as in traditional criminal 
investigations, for a limited period connected to the investigation of a 
particular crime), permit something akin to the 24–hour surveillance 
that worried some of the Court in Jones. Moreover, the bulk 
collection of data as to essentially the entire population of the United 
States, something inconceivable before the advent of high-speed 
computers, permits the development of a government database with a 
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dicta, that the seriousness of the constitutional concerns raised had 
some bearing on what they held.319 The court stated that the legis-
lative process should serve the primary role “in deciding, explicitly 
and after full debate, whether such programs are appropriate and 
necessary. Ideally, such issues should be resolved by the courts on-
ly after such debate, with due respect for any conclusions reached 
by the coordinate branches of government.”320 This notion was 
confirmed when Congress subsequently amended the language of 
section 215 to create a 180-day transition period, which the Second 
Circuit upheld.321 The court again declined to consider whether 
bulk collection of metadata violates the Fourth Amendment on the 
grounds that the transition period will soon expire and any viola-
tion of Fourth Amendment rights will be “temporary.”322 This 
suggests that legislators should be the ones to resolve the use of 
Stingrays as well. 
IV. STATE LEGISLATORS NEED TO PROVIDE STATUTORY 
GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF STINGRAYS AND IF THEY DO 
NOT, COURTS SHOULD RULE ON THEM INSTEAD 
As suggested in Clapper and elsewhere, in circumstances in-
volving dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy 
concerns are likely legislative.323 Like the DOJ, DHS, Washington, 
                                                                                                                            
potential for invasions of privacy unimaginable in the past. Thus, 
appellants argue, the program cannot simply be sustained on the 
reasoning that permits the government to obtain, for a limited period 
of time as applied to persons suspected of wrongdoing, a simple 
record of the phone numbers contained in their service providers’ 
billing records. 
Id. at 824. 
319 See id. 
320 See id. at 825. 
321 See ACLU v. Clapper, 804 F.3d 617, 618 (2d Cir. 2015). 
322 Id. at 626. 
323 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in 
judgment) (“A legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw 
detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.”); United 
States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 520 (11th Cir. 2015) (“If the rapid development of 
technology has any implications for our interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, it 
militates in favor of judicial caution, because Congress, not the judiciary, has the 
institutional competence to evaluate complex and evolving technologies.”). 
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Utah, Virginia, California, and Minnesota, states and agencies need 
to implement their own guidelines or legislation on the use of Stin-
grays. 
The remaining states should look to follow California’s tem-
plate and provide statutory guidance on the use of Stingrays. The 
California Electronic Communications Privacy Act is “the most 
comprehensive digital privacy law in the nation.”324 It ensures that 
law enforcement is granted a warrant prior to: 
[Obtaining] access to electronic information about 
who we are, where we go, who we know, and what 
we do. It requires a probable cause warrant for all 
digital content, location information, metadata, and 
access to devices like cell phones. The law’s notice 
and enforcement provisions make sure that there is 
proper oversight and mechanisms to ensure that the 
law is followed . . . [and] still includes appropriate 
exceptions to ensure that the police can continue to 
effectively and efficiently protect public safety.325 
While a legislative call to action across federal and state gov-
ernments may be the ideal solution, it is not going to happen over-
night, and courts need to provide a solution in the meantime. 
Therefore, when the use of a Stingray comes before a court, and 
where there is no statutory guidance in place, courts need to step in 
and decide whether evidence obtained as a result of Stingray use 
should be suppressed.326 If courts are not allowed or choose not to 
                                                                                                                            
324 California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA)—SB 178, AM. CIV. 
LIBERTIES UNION N. CAL., https://www.aclunc.org/our-work/legislation/calecpa 
[https://perma.cc/VZ79-ZRHQ] (last visited Feb. 24, 2016) [hereinafter ACLU on 
CalECPA]. 
325 Id. Most importantly, the Act has an exception for “an emergency involving danger 
of death or serious physical injury to any person.” S.B. 178, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
§ 1546.1(c)(5) (Cal. 2015), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml 
?bill_id=201520160SB178 [https://perma.cc/G43J-HEZ9]. 
326 See Patrick Toomey & Brett Max Kaufman, The Notice Paradox: Secret Surveillance, 
Criminal Defendants, & the Right to Notice, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 843, 898 (2014); see 
also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948) (“The point of the Fourth 
Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law 
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from 
evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral 
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
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step in, the government essentially has total control over the legali-
ty of Stingray use with no oversight by acting as judge and jury on 
their use behind closed doors.327 
Courts can and should step in to rule upon new investigative 
methods, as the legality of searches is significant for both defen-
dants and society as a whole.328 The protection provided by the 
courts “is one of the few ways in which the law can keep up with 
rapidly evolving technologies [when the legislators have declined to 
do so]—like the wiretapping in Katz, the thermal imaging in Kyllo, 
the GPS tracking in Jones, or the NSA’s bulk collection of phone 
records today.”329 Thus, to allow the government to continue to 
hold unilateral control over the legality of Stingrays by withholding 
its use from the courts would clearly be detrimental to the privacy 
interests of society.330 
Were a court given the chance to rule on the legality of a Stin-
gray under the Fourth Amendment, the court should look to Clap-
per for guidance. Despite the Second Circuit not ruling on the 
Fourth Amendment issue (and the differences between the NSA 
data collection program and Stingrays), the court still made use of 
general doctrinal principles relevant to modern warrantless 
searches under the Fourth Amendment.331 In discussing the Fourth 
Amendment implications of the case, the Clapper court made ref-
erence to the concern of “dragnet” surveillance in Knotts, the 
“mosaic” of information revealed through the surveillance in 
Jones, and that five of the Justices in Jones were suggesting that 
“there might be a Fourth Amendment violation even without the 
technical trespass upon which the majority opinion relied.”332 
                                                                                                                            
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime . . . . When the right of privacy must 
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not 
by a policeman or Government enforcement agent.”). 
327 See Toomey & Kaufman, supra note 326, at 898. 
328 See id. at 898–99. 
329 See id. at 899. 
330 See id. 
331 ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 822 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Appellants’ argument invokes 
one of the most difficult issues in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: the extent to which 
modern technology alters our traditional expectations of privacy.”). 
332 See id. at 823. 
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It was argued that the telephone metadata program provided 
“an archetypal example of the kind of technologically advanced 
surveillance techniques that . . . require a revision of the third-party 
records doctrine.”333 As discussed previously, such a revision to 
the third party doctrine is not necessary to find Stingray use illegal 
under the Fourth Amendment.334 Therefore, despite the fact that 
Stingrays do not invade upon the privacies of millions of people like 
the surveillance program in Clapper, they do conduct a sort of inva-
sion of privacy that, as with the NSA’s data collection program, 
was “unimaginable in the past.”335 If guidelines on the use of Stin-
grays are not going to be put forth by legislators in all jurisdictions, 
courts need to formulate their own guidelines on the use of Stin-
grays in order to protect the public’s Fourth Amendment inter-
ests.336 
CONCLUSION 
The public should not be forced to sacrifice the modern con-
venience—some would even say necessity—of a cell phone in favor 
of privacy. The practice of tracking suspects of petty crime with 
Stingrays obtained through federal anti-terror grants needs to stop. 
Currently, those people found through the use of Stingrays have no 
idea such a device was used to find them, thereby leaving the op-
portunity to challenge that search within government control. Such 
a unilateral control over society’s privacy interests is untenable. 
The real-time tracking of cell phone location data through a Stin-
gray is illegal without a warrant and courts need to be given the op-
portunity to make such a ruling if legislators everywhere are not 
going to proactively implement their own statutory guidance on 
Stingrays. 
                                                                                                                            
333 See id. at 824. 
334 See supra Section III.C. 
335 See Clapper, 785 F.3d at 824. 
336 The Seventh Circuit has finally taken up the issue in United States v. Patrick and will 
examine the Fourth Amendment implications of Stingray use. See Cyrus Farivar, 
Warrantless Stingray Case Finally Arrives Before Federal Appellate Judges, ARSTECHNICA 
(Jan. 29, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/01/warrantless-
stingray-case-finally-arrives-before-federal-appellate-judges/ [https://perma.cc/JHE5-
4J2T]. In this case, Damian Patrick was located in a car by the Milwaukee Police 
Department, with strong evidence he was located through the use of a Stingray. Id. This 
case should finally provide some clarity to the warrantless use of Stingrays. 
